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In the face of modern economic development resulting in fun-
damental changes in corporate structure and operations, traditional
views of the corporate personality in American law have become
increasingly inadequate. The problems of a complex corporate system
in the modern industrial age have outstripped traditional corporation
law, shaped long ago under very different conditions. Corporation
law in the United States (and in other countries as well) is breaking
down because of the increasing tension between the conventional
view of each corporation as a separate legal entity, irrespective of
its interrelationships with its affiliated corporations ("entity law"),
and the economic reality of a complex industrial society overwhelm-
ingly conducted by corporate groups: parent companies, sub-holding
companies, and innumerable subsidiary companies collectively con-
ducting worldwide integrated enterprises. The predominance of such
powerful multinational corporate complexes is creating irresistible
pressures for the development of new legal concepts to impose more
effective societal controls than those available under traditional entity
law reflecting the society of centuries ago.
The extensive discussion of the nature of the corporate person-
ality in the United States, a preoccupation of legal scholars for more
than a century, has become increasingly irrelevant. First, the dis-
cussion rests on a stereotyped view of "the corporation" that with
the passage of time no longer realistically describes the corporate
world. Second, the discussion has been overwhelmingly concerned
with an inquiry into the question of the rights to be accorded to the
corporation, particularly rights of a corporation under the United
States Constitution. These issues have long since been almost entirely
settled. The extent of corporate freedom of speech is one of the few
remaining issues. Today, reflecting the dramatic change in the nature
of corporate society, the crucial issue for heavily industrialized so-
cieties the world over, seeking to assure corporate responsibility and
accountability, has become the reverse, the imposition of duties upon
corporations, not the recognition of their rights.
Discussion of the corporate personality accordingly requires re-
examination and fundamental reorientation. Of central importance
in any such re-examination of the corporate juridical entity in the
modem world is the extent to which the legal consequences of the
actions of any subsidiary corporation should extend to its
1990]
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parent and affiliated companies in order to implement effectively the
policies and objectives of the law in the area involved. What is at
stake (in most, but not all legal questions of this nature) is the
continued acceptability of the principle of limited liability for each
of the separate controlled constituent companies, for each entity that
is part of a corporate group. Although entity law does not inevitably
involve limited liability, limited liability cannot exist without accep-
tance of entity law.'
The American discussion of the corporate personality to date
has largely ignored the modern development of corporate groups.
The commentaries assume the existence of the corporation as a
separate juridical unit, recognized by the law with those fundamental
attributes identified centuries ago by Coke,2 Kyd,3 and Blackstone':
the capacity to sue and be sued, to hold and to transfer property,
to have a term of existence, typically perpetual5-all separate from
the individuals or others who might own its shares from time to
time-and, in addition, the right of shareholders to transfer their
shares without any effect on corporate existence. This conception of
the corporation embodying these "core" rights, commonly called
entity law, has been a fundamental part of the Anglo-American legal
system for centuries. In reliance on medieval notions of Roman law
1. Numerous modem courts unaware of the early historic origins of entity
law long before the relatively recent triumph of limited liability incorrectly assume
that the two doctrines are essentially interrelated. See Blumberg, Limited Liability
and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986) [hereinafter Blumberg, Limited
Liability].
2. See, e.g., Case of Sutton's Hosp., 10 Coke 23a, 30b-32b, 77 Eng. Rep.
960, 970-73 (1612) (corporation is "invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment
and consideration of the law"); 2 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWES OF ENGLAND OR A COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON 250a (1628).
3. See 1 S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 69-70, 103
(1793).
4. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND §5 475-
476 (1st ed. 1765).
5. The English commentaries invariably refer to corporate existence as per-
petual. In fact, the early American statutes generally limited corporate life to fixed
terms of 20, 30, or 50 years. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 n.3 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Thus, the New York General Incorporation Act in 1811
fixed a maximum term of 20 years for manufacturing corporations. N.Y. Act of
Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67. Modem statutes generally permit incorporation for a fixed
term of years. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(4) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (1983 repl. vol.); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(iii),
Official Comment 3c (1984).
(Vol. 15
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that underlie all Western legal systems, 6 the corporation is concep-
tualized as a separate legal right-and-duty-bearing unit.7
The debate on corporate personality has not challenged this
centuries old principle. The debate in the United States has instead
been largely concerned with the very important (but less than fun-
damental) issue of the outer boundaries of corporate rights, partic-
ularly a corporation's constitutional rights to supplement the universally
accepted concept of the corporate juridical entity with its "core"
rights. Although different theories of the nature of the corporate
personality have been advanced to support the attribution or denial
of constitutional rights to corporations, none has either challenged
the corporation's existence as a separate entity or sought to broaden
the juridical unit to include interrelated corporations. This discussion
has focused on the extent of the constitutional protection against
actions of the federal and state governments to be extended over
corporations and their businesses, questions that arose with greatest
intensity a century ago in the days of vigorous economic development
when recognition of corporate interests to promote economic growth
had a special appeal.
Today, this framework for analysis has become outmoded.8 The
reality of our times, which the law must take into account, is that
large multinational corporations with hundreds of thousands of public
shareholders and corporate structures of "incredible complexity'' 9
dominate the modern business world. Such corporations and the legal
problems that they present are vastly different from the simple cor-
porations that constituted the business world when corporation law
took shape long ago.
It is no longer realistic to adhere to the traditional view that
for legal purposes each of the constituent corporations in a corporate
6. See W. BucKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 54 (F. Lawson 2d
ed. 1965); C. Carr, Early Forms of Corporateness, in 3 SELECT E $SAYS IN ANcLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 161 (1909); Wiliston, Histo y of the Law of Business
Corporations Before 1800 (pt. 2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 164 (1888).
7. This term, frequently used in the commentary, apparently originated with
Maitland. See 3 F. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 307, 314-15 (H. Fisher ed. 1911
reprinted 1979).
8. In an area of lesser importance, the same factors make desirable an
examination of the expansion of corporate legal rights to constituent companies of
corporate groups in certain areas of procedure. See P. BLUMNBERG, THE Lw oF
CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY COPO-
RATIONS (1983) [hereinafter BLUMBERO: PROCEDURE].
9. See Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 271, 273-74 (1984).
1990]
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group is a separate legal entity with rights and duties unaffected by
its functioning as an integral component of a group collectively
conducting a common business under common control. It is time
for the bench, bar, and academy to consider the circumstances under
which the parent and affiliated companies of the group should also
be liable for the duties and obligations of other group constituents
in order either to protect persons dealing with companies of the
group in cases arising at common law or to implement governmental
controls and prevent their frustration and evasion more effectively
in cases involving statutory law.
The issue whether the law should extend the rights and duties
of the parent corporation or other constituent companies of the
corporate group to reflect the activities of an affiliated company of
the group is increasingly becoming one of the major problems in
corporation law. By reason of the prominence of multinational com-
panies, enterprise liability is also looming as an important problem
in international law, international relations, and international bank-
ruptcy as well.
In the corporate area, this problem thus far has typically been
analyzed by reference to the body of law that I have termed "piercing
the corporate veil jurisprudence." Through this doctrine providing
isolated relief from the strictures of entity law and limited liability
in exceptional cases, the law has applied a single body of rules for
imposition of shareholder liability without regard to whether the
shareholder was an individual or the parent or an affiliated corpo-
ration of a giant multinational complex; in effect, a "shareholder"
is a "shareholder." Identical protection has traditionally been ac-
corded to the shareholder who is merely an investor in the corporate
business and to the shareholder-parent company in a complex cor-
porate group, which is itself engaged in the conduct of the business
of the group, although the relationships of these two very different
types of shareholders to the enterprise are universes apart. Reflecting
this vast discrepancy, both legislative and judicial authorities have
increasingly recognized that very different legal issues are presented
by these sharply contrasting relationships.
Statutory regulatory law, in particular, has widely abandoned
the traditional perception and has significantly moved from an entity
to an enterprise frame of reference. Many regulatory statutes utilize
such standards as "control," "controlling," and "controlled" or
employ numerical standards of stock ownership in order to extend
the regulatory program to all component companies of corporate
groups. American common law, too, is beginning to recognize the
[Vol. 15
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inadequacy of entity law in dealing with the special problems pre-
sented by complex multi-tiered corporate structures. In cases in-
volving the construction of statutes not expressly extending their
reach to all affiliated companies of a group, courts have construed
the statutes, particularly remedial statutes, liberally to do so. In the
process of construing the statutes, a special variant of "piercing the
veil jurisprudence" has emerged applying the doctrine free of some
of the significant restrictions applicable to common law controver-
sies. 10 Thus, the courts are moving at varying paces in different
areas of the law to acknowledge that "shareholder" protection for
parent corporations and sub-holding companies in corporate groups
may be very different from that accorded public shareholders of the
parent corporations or shareholders in small corporations. These signs
of transformation in the traditional perception of the corporation
represent the early stages in the development of enterprise law. While
such departures are beginning to occur, respect for the legal insulation
of the public shareholder continues unabated. Thus, in no case, to
the knowledge of the author, has liability been imposed on the public
shareholders of a parent corporation of a corporate group." Despite
the departures, limited liability has in all cases been perserved for
the very persons sought to be protected when the traditional concept
became fully accepted centuries ago.
As the future unfolds, the pressures for the extension of legal
obligations of individual companies of a corporate group to other
members of the group will likely lead to a reconsideration of entity
law in the case of the large modern corporation, conducting business
as a part of a complex corporate group and to a recognition of some
form of enterprise law.
10. See, e.g., Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir.
1981) (inquiry into construction of statutes "gives less respect to the corporate form
than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine"); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d
700, 717 (7th Cir. 1965); SEC v. Elmas Trading Co., 620 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D.
Nev. 1985); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021,
1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981). See also cases cited infra note 323; P. BLUMBERG, THE LAwv
OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER
STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (1989) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: GE14ERAL
STATUTORY LAWv].
11. A possible exception is Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, reh'g denied,
321 U.S. 804 (1944), imposing statutory double liability on public shareholders in
bank holding companies in an effort to prevent evasion of the double assessment
provisions of the Banking Act by the organization of holding companies. See BLU.%i-
BERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAv, supra note 10, § 2.03.
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"Piercing the veil jurisprudence" has provided the safety valve
in American law for American courts in "exceptional" cases to avoid
unacceptable results arising from the rigid application of entity law in
situations in which third parties have been injured by the substantial
departure of controlling shareholders from accepted corporate mores.
"Piercing the veil jurisprudence" has, however, typically hopelessly
muddled together the problem of the small businessperson, simulta-
neously conducting his or her business both personally and in corporate
form, and the issues raised by the largest corporations of our time
conducting integrated enterprises consisting of hundreds of affiliated
corporations in innumerable countries around the world.
Just as the traditional view is beginning to recognize the vital
difference between the issues presented by these very different economic
institutions, "piercing the veil jurisprudence" is similarly beginning to
change. In the past, cases applying "piercing the veil jurisprudence"
unwisely asserted that the parent (or controlling shareholder) and the
subsidiary (or controlled corporation) were a single entity for all pur-
poses. This view has become increasingly outmoded. In most modern
cases, the "piercing the veil" decisions do not challenge the existence
of the corporate entity of the subsidiary (or controlled corporation) for
all purposes. Instead, they typically attribute certain rights or impose
certain duties upon the group (or controlling shareholder) by reason
of the activities of its subsidiary (or controlled corporation) only for the
purposes of the case at hand. The American "piercing the veil" cases,
thus, continue to acknowledge the primary role of entity law in the
American legal system. They are still concerned only with the secondary
issue of the imposition in "exceptional" cases of the duties or obligations
of constituent companies of a corporate group on the parent corporation
or other companies of the group.
Thus, contemporary consideration of enterprise law, like the his-
torical discussion of the nature of the corporate personality, involves
an examination in particular cases of the attribution of rights and
imposition of duties in particular cases on constituent companies of
corporate groups. It does not yet undertake a basic challenge of the
separate corporate existence of the controlled company for other pur-
poses. It has, however, abandoned the earlier philosophy that empha-
sized the universality of the relationship of all corporations to their
shareholders, irrespective of whether the shareholders were the ultimate
public investors in the enterprise or affiliated companies, themselves
engaged in the conduct of the enterprise, particularly affiliated com-
panies collectively engaged with their parent corporation in the conduct
of a unitary business under common control. Instead of automatically
[Vol. 15
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insulating the parent corporation and its sub-holding companies and
affiliated subsidiary companies from all legal consequences for acts of
a subsidiary corporation in accordance with traditional entity law, the
newer enterprise view makes the attribution of rights and imposition
of duties with respect to related corporations under common control
turn, in the particular case, on the extent of the interrelationship
between the group and its component controlled companies. This will
reflect the extent of organizational direction (that is, the exercise of
group control), economic interdependence and economic integration,
administrative and financial interdependence, and use of a common
public persona. It will also turn on whether enterprise or entity law
most effectively implements the underlying objectives of the law in the
case at hand.
A fuller understanding of the influence of these changing concepts
of the nature of the corporate personality in American law requires
careful analysis of the various cases in which such questions of entity
or enterprise have been central in the attribution of corporate rights
or imposition of corporate duties for the purposes of the litigation at
hand. Such an examination in comprehensive form would be an enor-
mous encyclopedic undertaking well beyond the scope of this review.
With respect to rights, it would involve primarily an examination of
the numerous Supreme Court decisions which have almost fully resolved
uncertainties with respect to the status of corporations under the various
provisions of the United States Constitution. It would also involve a
review of decisions, particularly in the procedural area, extending
procedural and other rights of controlled companies to the parent and
affiliated companies of the group. With respect to duties and obligations,
it would involve a comprehensive review of the thousands of decisions,
arising in private common law, primarily in tort and contract, and in
statutory law under governmental regulatory programs.
To remain within acceptable limitations, this article reviews these
matters in summary form. Although constitutional developments have
been elaborately explored in the literature, a summary review is essential
for a fuller understanding of the incipient movement away from entity
law toward the imposition in selected areas, both under common law
and statutory law, of duties and obligations of subsidiary companies
on their parent and affiliated corporations.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATE
PERSONALITY
Although recognition of the separate legal personality of the cor-
poration-separate from that of the shareholders-goes back centuries,
1990]
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there has been intensive controversy on the jurisprudential level as to
the exact nature of the corporation as a legal institution. The discussion
has been worldwide with an enormous bibliography, 2 described, as
long ago as 1911, to be of "appalling size."'"
As is well known, this development has gone through three stages
in the United States. It now appears to be entering a fourth stage
which has not attracted the attention it deserves.
First, in the early days of the Republic prior to the adoption of
general incorporation statutes, when each corporation was chartered
by a special act of the legislature, the corporation was seen as an
"artificial person" as visualized by Coke, Kyd, and Blackstone. 14 It
was the creation of the legislature, owing its existence to state action,
rather than to the acts of its shareholder-incorporators. This view-
alternatively called the artificial person, or fiction, or concession, or grant
doctrine 15-was exemplified by Chief Justice Marshall's description of
the corporation in the Dartmouth College case:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
12. See generally E. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1978); A. NWKNI, THE
PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938); S. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND
ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY INTO CORPORATE THEORY (1973); 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1958); Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate
Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917); Dewey, The Historic Background of
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954); Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29
HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Machen, Corporate Personality (pts. I & 2), 24 HARV,
L. REV. 253, 255, 257 (1911); Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32
COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932).
More recent literature includes: Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:
A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1989); Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive
History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 575 (1989);
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173 (1985); Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1597-601, 1640-51 (1988); Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal.-
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L.J. 577 (1990); Schane, The Corporation
Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TULANE L. REV. 563 (1986); Comment,
The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. Ct. L. REV.
1441 (1987); Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641
(1982).
13. See Machen, supra note 12, at 254 n.3.
14. See supra notes 2-4.
15. These form sub-sets of the theory with differing emphasis, but as Professor
Dewey said in distinguishing between the fiction and concession theories: "In spite
of their historical and logical divergence, the two theories flowed together." See
Dewey, supra note 12, at 668.
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of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
to its very existence. 6
The essence of this view is that the corporation is a separate
juridical unit created by state action, an artificial creature of the state
possessing in addition to its essential "core" attributes only such limited
powers as are granted by the state. While a separate legal entity, its
legal capacity beyond its "core rights" depends on its charter and
thereby differs decisively from the fuller panoply of legal rights possessed
by natural persons. (We shall accordingly refer to it as the "artificial
person"' 7 or "weak entity" theory.) This Anglo-American view of the
corporation also prevailed on the continent in the same period.',
In early Supreme Court cases considering the application of the
new Constitution to corporations, a second, more complex theory of
the corporate personality emerged. Facilitating the attribution to a
corporation of constitutional rights protecting the interests of share-
holders to supplement its common law "core" attributes, this theory
perceived the corporation as an association of individuals contracting
with each other in organizing the corporation. The subsequent growth
of general incorporation statutes making corporate status freely available",
moved the predominant role in corporate organization from the state
to the incorporators and shareholders. This development made reliance
on the associational view even more appealing.
As Justice Field said in The Railroad Tax Cases:
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but...
they consist of aggregations of individuals united for some
legitimate business .. .. It would be a most singular result
if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of
every person against partial and discriminating legislation by
0
16. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1810).
17. The "artificial person" or "weak entity" view should not be confused
with the theories referring to the corporate "person" or "personhood" or "per-
sonification." These frequently are referring to the "real person" or strong entity
view of the corporation. See, e.g., Schane, supra note 12; Note, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., G. HEINAN, OTTO GIERKE: ASSOCIATIONS AND LAw 27-33 (1977)
(reviewing views of Savigny). See also Machen, supra note 12, at 255.
19. New York enacted the first general incorporation statute as early as 1811;
this was the first in the world. N.Y. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67. However,
general incorporation did not become the norm until the 1870s. See W. Hun-sr,
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusiNEss CORPORATION 37 (1970).
19901
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the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment
the person becomes a member of a corporation. 0
This conception of the corporation has alternatively been called the
aggregate, or group, or associational, or contract theory.21 (We shall refer
to this view as the "associational" theory.)
Under this view, the constitutional rights of shareholders are
attributed to the corporation because "the courts will always look
beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it
represents.' '22 However, the theory does not involve any suggestion
that the corporation was not a separate legal entity of its own-separate
and different from its shareholders-with the "core" rights traditionally
recognized by the common law. 23
While Chief Justice Taney, among others, recognized that the
associational theory was theoretically inconsistent with the concept of
limited liability, 24 reliance on it did not lead to any threat to the
continued acceptance of limited liability.2 5 Nor did any case seem to
20. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 743-44 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of
error dismissed as moot sub nom. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S.
138 (1885); Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883),
aff'd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
21. See id. at 744-58; V. MORAWETZ, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1
(1882) ("the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights
and duties of the persons who compose it, not of an imaginary being").
22. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 744.
23. Thus, in The Railroad Tax Cases, Justice Field adopted the following
argument of John Norton Pomeroy, counsel for the railroad:
Whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an artificial, metaphysical
being, separate and distinct from the individual members, and whatever
distinctions the common law makes, in carrying out the technical legal
conception, between property of the corporation and that of the individual
members, still, in applying the fundamental guarantees of the constitution,
and in thus protec~ng the rights of property, these metaphysical and
technical notions must give way to the reality. The truth cannot be evaded
that, for the purpose of protecting rights, the property of all business and
trading corporations is the property of the individual corporators.
Id. at 758.
The associational view is advanced to support the attribution of the constitutional
rights of shareholders to the corporation, not to destroy the separate legal entity
of the corporation.
24. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (5 Pet.) 517, 586 (1839) (Taney,
C.J.); infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
25. After the firm tilt towards limited liability climaxed by the adoption of
a limited liability statute by Massachusetts in 1830, the political struggle over the
issue continued for another two decades or so. There were repeated attempts to
revise limited liability but they ultimately failed. Michigan in 1837, New Hampshire
[Vol. 15
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have challenged the fundamental attributes flowing from recognition
of the corporation as a separate juridical unit-with such essential
"core" attributes as the capacity to sue and be sued,-, the capacity
to hold and transfer property, and to have perpetual existence, irre-
spective of any change in its shareholders as a result of death or transfer
or otherwise. Conversely, there was no movement to permit share-
holders directly to assert such corporate rights.
Third, the corporation has been perceived as an organic social
reality with an existence independent of, and constituting something
more than, its changing shareholders. This has been termed the natural
entity, or real entity, or realism theory.27 Under this view, the corporation
is a juridical unit with its own claims, much like those of a natural
person, that extend beyond both the circumstances of its legal creation
by the state and the claims or interests of its shareholders. It is the
ultimate stage of the entity view. (Accordingly, we shall refer to it as
the "strong entity" view.)
As Professor Teubner points out, each of the competing contentions
involved in "the old dispute on the nature of corporate personality"''
has some validity and contributes to a better understanding of the full
dimensions of a "remarkably fluctuating reality."2 The corporation
is indeed simultaneously a legal fiction, a contractual network, and a
"real" organization. Teubner notes that "Max Weber came dosest
in 1842, Wisconsin in 1849, and Pennsylvania in 1853 briefly turned to unlimited
liability but soon returned to limited liability. 1837 Mich. Laws §§ 285, 286; 1842
N.H. Laws 55 605, 607. Such actions reflected the earlier division on the issue.
They clearly did not arise from the adoption of general incorporation statutes; these
have been seen as representing a political compromise in which the Jacksonians
reluctantly traded off limited liability in order to gain acceptance of general incor-
poration. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UrIL 1860, at 384-85
(1954); Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 1. Further, these unsuccessful efforts
to restore limited liability came to an end before the full emergence of the asso-
ciational theory.
26. From the early days of the Republic, suits involving corporate rights and
liabilities were brought by or against the corporation, not by or against shareholders.
E.g., Graves v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 419 (2 Cranch) (1805); Marine
Ins. Co. v. Young, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 332 (1803); Bank of N. Am. v. McKnight,
2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 157 (Pa. 1792).
27. See Machen, supra note 12, at 261-62 (a real and natural entity); Vino-
gradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 602 (1924). &e also E. FREuNo,
THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897); 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGES (1958).
28. Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of
the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 130, 138 (1988).
29. Id.
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to capturing this ambivalence by treating collectivities only as 'ideas'
in the heads of judges . . . while at the same time assigning them 'a
powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course of action of
real individuals."' 30
A remarkable amount of scholarly examination of these theories
has continued for more than a century. After decades of debate, the
growth of the "legal realism" movement 3' during the 1920s led to
increasing recognition that, whatever its philosophical nature, the cor-
poration was a "means to achieve an economic purpose ' 3 2 and that
the fundamental issue was not one of theoretical concept but the
adaptation of the law to achieve an appropriate degree of control over
the activities of the corporation in the light of the political values of
the times.
31
For half a century thereafter, the intensity of interest in the problem
of corporate personality ebbed. Then with the great increase in the
utilization of economics as a tool for examination of legal institutions,
libertarian scholars arguing for increased reliance on market forces
reopened the debate. They have rejected the emphasis on the central
role of state action embodied in the artificial person view. Instead they
underscore the role of shareholders as contracting parties in organizing
the corporation, 4 and depict the corporation in associational terms as
a complex network of various contracting parties.35 In effect, they seek
to justify reduced governmental intervention in economic matters by
reasserting the associational view.
30. Id. (citing M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13 (1978)). (When we
examine the American decisions and see how the courts variously appeal to one
theory or another to support their result, we will appreciate more fully the power
of such " 'ideas' in the heads of judges.")
31. See L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-60, ch. 1 (1986).
32. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 130, 133 (Tanaka,
J., dissenting). See also Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110,
119, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (Bijur, J.) ("more nearly a method
than a thing"), quoted in H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 147
(3d ed. 1983).
33. Professor Dewey pointed this out so effectively in 1926 that further the-
oretical discussion subsided. See Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
34. See R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION chs. 1, 2 (1979); R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978).
35. See, e.g., AIchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 787 (1972); Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305
(1976). See also Bratton, supra note 12.
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This history, familiar to all American students of corporation law,
sets the stage for the present inquiry. To what extent have these
competing theories been accepted by the courts in determining the
constitutional or other rights and obligations of the corporation involved,
for purposes of deciding the particular case before them? What alter-
native new principles have emerged as judicial standards for the at-
tribution of corporate rights or, more importantly, in the newer area
of the imposition of corporate responsibilities?
The three traditional theories have much more than philosophical
interest. They have played a fundamental role in shaping the law.
The view of the corporation as an "artificial person" underlies entity
law, the view of the corporation with rights and duties separate from
those of its shareholders, which for ages past was the prevailing view
of Western jurisprudence. Arising from historical and philosophical
roots, this ancient doctrine, which preceded the triumph of limited
liability by centuries, has been tremendously reinforced by it. Entity
law provides the substratum on which Anglo-American corporation law
rests.
As we will see, the view of the corporation as an association or
aggregate of the individuals composing it played an important role in
the late nineteenth century in facilitating the development of the law
to broaden and extend constitutional protections to corporations in
order to protect the economic interests of shareholders. It survives
today in some areas of the law regulating internal corporate affairs.
Even where accepted, it has been used to support the attribution of
shareholders' interests to the corporation for assertion by the corporation,
not by shareholders. Moreover, it has had no influence whatsoever in
issues involving the imposition of liability or other duties on share-
holders. Thus, notwithstanding any philosophical inconsistency, the
doctrine has not led to any abandonment of entity law or lack of full
recognition of the corporation as a separate juridical unit.
The third stage in theories of the corporate personality has seen
the corporation as a "real entity" with its own interests transcending
those of its shareholders. This view has dominated corporation law for
decades. It is particularly evident in the final period of constitutional
development in which the Court extended constitutional protection to
corporations under numerous provisions so that today corporations
have, with isolated exceptions,35 the same constitutional status as natural
persons.
36. Corporations are not protected by the privileges and/or immunities clauses
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American law is now entering a fourth stage. In American statutory
law, in particular, traditional theories of the corporate personality are
being increasingly supplemented by newer doctrines emphasizing en-
terprise over entity. This development is a response to the fundamental
need to establish effective legal controls over the very large corporations
that dominate the economic system.37 These very large corporations
typically operate as multi-tiered multinational groups of parent and
subsidiary corporations collectively conducting worldwide economically
integrated enterprises that for legal or political purposes have been
fragmented among the constituent companies of the group.
In selected areas, the law is beginning to recognize corporate
groups rather than a particular subsidiary company, as the juridical
unit, and to impose group obligations and, less frequently, to recognize
group rights as well. In this movement, still in its early stages, the
enterprise theory of the corporation is beginning to emerge. This theory
which treats the corporate group as the juridical unit, while still in-
choate, has already won acceptance in important areas of the law.3
As traced in The Law of Corporate Groups,3 9 this very significant devel-
opment in American law has not yet matured so as to emerge as a
coherent philosophy.
of article four and the fourteenth amendment, nor by the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. It is still not clear whether they are protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment against deprivation of "liberty," nor
is the extent of corporate freedom of speech entirely settled. See infra text accom-
panying notes 78-96, 106, 107-15, respectively. Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 58 U.S.L.W. 437, (U.S. Mar. 27, 1990).
37. See STAT. ABSTR. OF U.S., Tables Nos. 884, 885 (1989); N.Y. STOCK
EXCH. FACT BOOK 78 (1986).
38. In "piercing the veil jurisprudence," the crucial factor is the intimate
interrelationship of the component companies of the group and their operation under
common control. Thus, it does not generally matter whether the litigation seeks to
impose liability upon a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary or upon a
subsidiary for acts of its parent or upon one subsidiary for the acts of a sister
subsidiary. Intragroup liability extends to all members of the group conducting
fragmented portions of an enterprise under common control. See P. BLUMBERG, THE
LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS
IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 8.03, 21.01,
21.02 (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW]; BLUMBERO: PRO-
CEDURE, supra note 8, §§ 21.01-21.03.
39. See BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8; P. BLUMBERO, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES
(1985) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: BANKRUPTCY]; BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW,
supra note 38; BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10.
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One important manifestation of an enterprise analysis is the use
of the doctrine of "control" employed in many federal statutes to
expand the scope of the regulatory program to embrace interrelated
companies as well as the group constituent subject to regulation. Another
is the "unitary business" standard developed in the worldwide unitary
tax apportionment cases to determine the constitutionality of state tax-
ation of local units of multinational corporations. Still another is the
"integrated enterprise" doctrine in labor law and employment discrim-
ination law. Finally, there are the numerous modem developments in
"piercing the veil jurisprudence" which I have termed the law of
corporate groups °
In these respects, American law, while still retaining entity law in
most areas, is increasingly supplementing traditional theories of the
corporate personality with newer doctrines emphasizing enterprise over
entity.
How influential are the theories of the corporation? What have
been their role and significance? Is the theory the moving factor for
the judicial decision? Alternatively, does the decision rest on other
considerations with the theory utilized as an argument to support the
decision? Indeed, on occasion are both of these factors at work si-
multaneously? Let us turn then to the decided cases.
III. THE CORPORATE PERSONALrY IN THE COURTS
A. Constitutional Appli.lions
The cases involving the application of various provisions of the
United States Constitution to the corporation provide a particularly
fertile area for examination of judicial approaches to the corporate
personality.
Although the concept of the separate legal personality had been
firmly embraced by the English legal system long before the American
Revolution and by the United States after the Revolution, this meant
only that the corporation was a legal entity distinct from its shareholders
with fundamental "core rights." Entity law did not provide a ready
answer to the uncertainties of the application of the new Constitution
40. See BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8; BLUMBERG: BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 39; BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAw, supra note 38; BLUMBERc: G&NERAL
STATUTORY LAw, supra note 10. The fifth volume, being written in collaboration
with Professor Kurt A. Strasser, deals with statutory law directly applicable to
parent and subsidiary corporations and will appear in 1992.
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to corporations. However, the process of constitutional construction
inevitably involved consideration of various theories of the corporate
personality in determining the extent to which corporations could invoke
constitutional provisions and obtain constitutional rights in addition to
their unchallenged "core rights" at common law.
The new Republic knew little about corporations. At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, there were very few corporations. As
late as 1801, there were only 317 corporations in the entire country.4
These were almost entirely in banking, insurance, and public service
areas; only a handful were manufacturing corporations. This condition
began to change with the growth of the textile industry following the
introduction of the power loom, the embargo laws against manufactured
imports, and the War of 1812.42 However, not until the 1830s did
charters for manufacturing corporations exceed those for banking, in-
surance, and public service corporations.43 Determining constitutional
meaning and intent with respect to a class of parties with which neither
the society nor the law had had much experience rendered the problem
of constitutional construction even more difficult.
The language of the Constitution complicated the problem. For
example, the Constitution does not uniformly describe the parties it
protects. In different provisions, it refers to "person" or "citizens" or
"people." Other provisions generally prohibit certain acts by the federal
government without reference to the class protected. Are these terms
being used as precise delimitations of the class being protected or are
they simply generic references sweeping all juridical entities under their
protection?
The issue of whether corporations are protected by a constitutional
provision has arisen in the following areas:
41. 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS,
NUMBER 4, EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
27 (1917) (reissued 1965); W. HUPST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPO-
RATIONS 14 (1970).
42. In contrast to only seven Arkwright loom mills in the United States in
1800, the number of New England textile workers skyrocketed to 100,000 by 1815,
The number of spindles increased from 8,000 in 1807 to 191,000 in 1820 and to
1,250,000 in 1831. See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 38,
§ 1.04.3. The number of corporations increased from 317 in 1801 to 1,500 in 1816.
See R. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 153 (1984); Blumberg, Limited
Liability, supra note 1.




Art. I, 5 10, c. 1
Art. III, § 2, c. 1











____ 44 Impairment of Contracts'















Due Process of Law 
s
"Person" Equal Protection of the
Law5 4
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44. This provision is a general restraint on the states without reference to
any particular class or group.
45. Corporations included. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1810).
46. Corporations included. Corporations are not citizens for this purpose.
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). However, jurisdiction
was, nevertheless, determined by citizenship of the shareholders. Id. at 91. Later,
it was held that the corporation "although an artificial person" wai "deemed" to
have the citizenship of the state in which incorporated or was conclusively presumed
to have such citizenship, respectively. Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 314 (1853); Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497, 557-58 (1844).
47. Corporations not included. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 517 (1839).
48. This provision is a general restraint on the federal government without
reference to any particular class or group.
49. Corporations included. Se First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1968).
50. Corporations included. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wall-
ing, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
51. Corporations not included. Sce, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
52. Corporations not included. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
53. Corporations included. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26
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1. "Citizens"
a. Diversity-of-Citizenship Jurisdiction: Article III
The first corporate constitutional controversy arose in connection
with diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Article III, section 2, clause
1 of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial system may
hear "cases" or "controversies" between "citizens" of different
states.5 6 This was clear enough in the case of natural persons, 7 but
what of corporations? Was a corporation a "citizen" for purposes
of this provision? If so, of what state was it a "citizen"? 5 8
This question arose in 1808 in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
in which a corporate action 60 on a note was brought in the federal
court under diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. The district court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, holding that a corporation could
not be a "citizen" and accordingly, that diversity of citizenship could
not arise. 61 If not reversed, this decision would have barred all
litigation involving corporations-whether as plaintiff or defendant-
from the federal courts insofar as common law matters or state
corporation law matters were concerned.62 Thus, the issue far tran-
(1889). But see Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting).
54. Corporations included. See, e.g., Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1986). But see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562, 576 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Corporations not included. See, e.g., United States v. Hague, 307 U.S.
496, 514 (1939); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907);
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co., 125 U.S. at 187-88.
56. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, 5 2, cl. 1.
57. In the case of natural persons, citizenship was determined by residence,
a doctrine later confirmed in the fourteenth amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
58. See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HARV. L. Rzv. 853 (1943).
59. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
60. Alleging their citizenship in Pennsylvania, "[the] President, Directors and
Company of the Bank of the United States" sued residents of Georgia on a note
in the federal district court in Georgia. Id. at 61-62. The quoted reference is the
name of the corporation as set forth in the statute of incorporation, reflecting the
style of the time. Act of Feb. 25, 1791 § 3, 1 Stat. 283. The suit asserts a "corporate
right" in the "corporate name." Deveaux, 9 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 86-87. The indi-
viduals holding the office of president or director were not parties.
61. See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 2 F. Cas. 692, 693 (C.C.D. Ga. 1808)
(No. 916).
62. Cases not involving federal questions or admiralty matters may be heard
in the federal courts only under diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction.
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scended the impact on the immediate parties. It involved the role
of the new federal judicial power over major areas of law affecting
the new corporate society.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous court, first described the corporation in
language borrowed from Coke and Blackstone63 "as a mere creature
of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal. " 61 He agreed with
the district court that a corporation, "[t]hat invisible, intangible,
and artificial being, that mere legal entity[,]... is certainly not a
citizen .... 65 However, unlike the lower court, he went further
and upheld the action. He disregarded the separate legal personality
of the corporation and held that for purposes of determining juris-
diction, the case was controlled by the citizenship of its shareholders.
He stated that "the controversy is, in fact and in law, between those
persons [the shareholders] suing in their corporate character, by their
corporate name, for a corporate right"66 and the other party. The
term "citizen" is only used "to describe the real persons who come
into court, in this case, under their corporate name." 67
In terms of the theory of the nature of the corporation, the
rationale of the decision in Deveaux clearly represents an early, if not
the earliest, judicial expression of the associational view of the cor-
poration. However, the decision does not challenge the fundamental
principles of entity law. Chief Justice Marshall made it plain that
the associational view was superimposed upon, rather than replacing,
entity law. Thus, he carefully referred to the corporation as a "mere
creature of the law," "an artificial being" and "a mere legal entity"
and emphasized that the case involved the assertion in "corporate
name" of a "corporate right."6s The judgment was for the corpo-
ration, not its shareholders. Shareholder interests entered only to
support the assertion of federal jurisdiction over corporate litigation
and the attribution to corporate entities of the ability to sue and be
sued in federal courts under the diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction
clause.
63. Marshall acknowledged that "our ideas of a corporation, its privileges
and its disabilities, are derived entirely from the English books .... " Dtraux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) at 88.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id. at 87.
67. Id. at 91.
68. Id. at 86-87.
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Decades later in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v.
Letson,69 decided in 1844, and Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,70
decided in 1855, the Court abandoned this technique of looking
through corporate parties to the citizenship of their shareholders for
the purpose of determining corporate citizenship for diversity juris-
diction purposes.7 While recognizing that a corporation was not a
"citizen" for this purpose, it, nevertheless, insisted on preserving
the "valuable privilege" of federal jurisdiction for corporations.12
The Court held that irrespective of the actual citizenship of share-
holders, it would be conclusively presumed that the shareholders of
a corporation were citizens of the state of incorporation. 3 Through
this "bizarre" legal fiction, 4 the corporation received the jurisdic-
tional opportunities open to citizens without the Court having to
accord "citizenship" to it.' 5
The determination of a corporation's rights, duties, or standing
to sue by reference to the character or interests of its shareholders
as in Deveaux and its progeny is not unknown in other areas of the
69. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
In Letson, the Court rejected the Deveaux standard and revertcd to the "weak
entity" view of the corporation. The Court held that for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, a corporation was to be regarded as "a person, though an artificial
one, inhabiting and belonging to [the state of incorporation] and therefore entitled,
for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state."
Id. at 555.
The holding in Lelson that a corporation was a "citizen" was controversial.
It provoked repeated dissent from the Court in subsequent cases. E.g., Northern
Ind. R.R. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 233, 246 (1853) (Catron,
J., dissenting); Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80,
95 (1852) (Daniel, J., dissenting). In the Marshall case, decided 11 years later, the
Court found it prudent to retreat in theory, but not in result.
70. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
71. E.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank v. Slocomb, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840).
72. Marshall, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 327-28.
73. Id. at 328-29.
74. See Schane, supra note 12, at 580.
75. American law today recognizes the state of incorporation as decisive for
diversity jurisdiction purposes. Section 1332(c) of title 28 of the United States Code
provides: "[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."
Through the provision for a corporation to be a citizen of more than one state,
the Congress was restricting diversity citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). See
BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, §§ 9.02-.08.
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law, both in the United States 6 and in England," dealing with such
matters as status as an enemy alien or as a charitable corporation.
While these decisions characterize the corporation as a "citizen" or
as an "enemy" or as "charitable" by reference to the shareholders,
such characterization and attribution only determine certain rights
and liabilities of the corporation. They do not transfer such rights or
liabilities to the shareholders.
b. Privileges and/or Immunities: Article Four and Fourteenth Amendment
"Citizens" is also the crucial term in article IV, section 2,
providing that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States '"7 and in
the fourteenth amendment, section 1, providing that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.''1 9 In a series of cases,
the Court consistently held that corporations were not "citizens" for
these purposes and refused to apply article IV and the fourteenth
amendment to invalidate state statutes discriminating against foreign
corporations.
76. Thus, in the area of state governmental immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, it is clear that profit-making governmental owned instru-
mentalities are also constitutionally exempt in cases where the instrumentality is
regarded as the "arm" or "alter ego" of the state. The immunity of the govern-
mental shareholder is attributed to them. E.g., Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd.
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 818 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir. 1987); Feeney v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 693 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See BLU~N1ERo:, GENErAL
STATUTORY LAW supra note 10, § 3.09.
Similarly in Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, a subsidiary of Harvard University
operating an electric power generation plant was held to qualify as charitable for
purposes of the- Clean Air Act. 667 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1981).
In these cases, the character of the shareholder was decisive although it is
evident that but for the attribution of the shareholders' status to the corporation,
the corporation would not qualify.
77. E.g., Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre (Great Britain) Co., [1916] 2 A.C.
307 (H.L.) (company held an enemy alien, although organized in England and
conducting its business there, where all of its shareholders, except one, and directors
were citizens and residents of Germany); Abbey Malvern Wells Ltd. v. Minister
of Local Gov't & Planning, [1951] Ch. 728 (profit-making corporation operating
a school held charitable and exempt from assessments when all shares were held
in trust for charitable purposes).
An Irish commentator correctly has concluded that the English decisions do
not in any way disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation. St R.
KEANE, COMPANY LAw IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND §§ 10.19-.20 (1985).
78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 5 2 (emphasis added).
79. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
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Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,80 holding that a corporation
was not a "citizen" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, also casts
its shadow over the construction of the similar reference in article
IV, section 2 that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 8' In
Bank of Augusta v. Earle,82 decided in 1839, the Court affirmed that
corporations were not "citizens" and refused to apply article IV to
invalidate a state statute discriminating against foreign corporations.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney relied entirely on
entity law and the "artificial person" theory. Pointedly refusing to
apply the associational theory, he stated: "Whenever a corporation
makes a contract, it is the contract of the legal entity-of the artificial
being created by the charter-and not the contract of the individual
members.'' 83 He concluded that a corporation was .'a mere
creature'''84 of local law without any "legal existence out of the
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.''85 Unlike
Deveaux, the Court refused to look to the shareholders and outlaw
such discrimination as a means of protecting shareholder rights.
Chief Justice Taney was concerned with the implications of a
contrary decision resting on the associational theory for the limited
liability of shareholders. Seeking to avoid impairment of the principle
of limitation of liability, he pointed out that if:
members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals
carrying on business in their corporate name, and therefore,
entitled to the privileges of citizens, in matters of contract,
it is very clear, that they must, at the same time, take
upon themselves the liabilities of citizens, and be bound by
their contracts in like manner [and] be liable, to the whole
extent of [their] property, for the debts of the corporation
86
There is no fundamental inconsistency between the traditional
"artificial person" view and the associational view. As we have seen,
the cases such as Deveaux and Dartmouth College enunciating the as-
80. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
82. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839).
83. Id. at 587.
84. Id. (quoting Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804)).
85. Id. at 588. See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868).
86. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 586.
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sociational theory also reaffirmed the traditional view. In Bank of
Augusta, Chief Justice Taney, however, realized that reliance on
shareholder interests to attribute constitutional rights to corporations
in addition to their traditional common law "core" rights might
well lead to the reverse process of attributing corporate duties to
shareholders and thus destroy limited liability. Until the early nine-
teenth century, the law had in fact recognized both traditional entity
law and unlimited liability of shareholders.8 7 Chief Justice Taney,
writing fresh on the heels of the triumph of limited liability and at
a time when not all states had embraced the principle, c3 evidently
did not want to contribute to possible reversal of this development.
Almost thirty years later, the issue came again before the Court
in Paul v. Virginia 9 decided in 1868. By this time under Lelson and
Marshall, corporations were deemed "citizens" for purposes of the
Diversity-of-Citizenship Jurisdiction clause. The Court, however, re-
affirmed its conclusion in Bank of Augusta and again held that a
corporation was not a "citizen" for purposes of the privileges and
immunities clause of article four. Justice Field stated: "The term
citizens ... applies only to natural persons, members of the body
politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created
by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the leg-
islature has prescribed. ""
Conceptually, the different conclusions on the two constitutional
references are manifestly inconsistent. However, as a matter of con-
stitutional development, opening the federal courts to litigation in-
volving corporations is a very different issue from permitting states
to exclude foreign corporations in matters not involving interstate
commerce. 91 The fact that the same constitutional term, "citizen,"
was employed did not prevent conflicting conclusions on its appli-
cability to corporations.
The fourteenth amendment adopted in 1868 also contained a
privileges or immunities clause 2 applicable to "citizens of the United
87. See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAw, supra note 38, § 1.02.
88. See BLUMBERG: LIMITED LIABILITY, supra note 1.
89. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (Field, J.).
90. Id. at 177.
91. See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926); Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 517 (1839).
92. Article IV, 5 2, clause 1 refers to "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States" while the fourteenth amendment, § I refers to "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" (emphasis added).
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States." However, unlike articles III and IV, the new amendment
defined "citizen" as "persons born or naturalized in the United
States," terms difficult to adapt and apply to corporations. 3 In
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,9" de-
cided in 1888, involving the applicability of this fourteenth amend-
ment clause to a discriminatory Pennsylvania tax on foreign
corporations, Justice Field, writing for the Court and quoting from
his opinion in Paul v. Virginia95 that restricted "citizens" in article
four to natural persons, had no difficulty in holding that in the
fourteenth amendment, like the fourth amendment, the term "cit-
izens" applied only to natural persons, not to corporations. 96
2. "Person"
The term "person" is the crucial term in no less than four
constitutional provisions: the equal protection and the due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment and the self-incrimination and
the double jeopardy clauses of the fifth amendment. The Court has
held that corporations are protected persons under the equal pro-
tection, due process, and double jeopardy clauses, but are not pro-
tected under the self-incrimination clause.
a. Equal Protection of the Laws: Fourteenth Amendment
The status of the corporation under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment referring to "person" first arose before
the Supreme Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,97
93. The Amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States . . .are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
95. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868).
96. Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co., 125 U.S. at 187-88. Accord
United States v. Hague, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939); Western Turf Ass'n v. Green-
berg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907).
Article IV refers to "Citizens of each State" while the fourteenth amendment
refers to "citizens of the United States." Although Pembina did not focus on this
distinction, the Court in the Slaughter House cases construed the reference so re-
strictively that the provision has become the "almost forgotten ... clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935) (Stone,
J., dissenting) (citing Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)). Thus,
the clause has been described as "practically a dead letter." Morrison, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 144 (1949).
See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY ch. 3 (1977).
97. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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decided in 1886. Although the question had been argued at length
in the various briefs, the Court surprisingly announced:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
applies to . . . corporations. We are all of opinion that it
does. 98
The Court's brief announcement threw no light on the rationale for
the conclusion.99
Although some scholars have looked upon Santa Clara as reflecting
the view that the corporation was a "person" for constitutional
purposes generally with rights comparable to those of natural persons,
Professor Horwitz, among others, disagrees."" Setting Santa Clara
against the legal thought of its time, Professor Horwitz concludes
that the Court was in fact applying the associational theory of the
corporation. Relying in part on two of Justice Field's opinions in
the circuit courts below, 10 Professor Horwitz asserts that the cor-
poration's interests for these constitutional purposes were seen as
identical to its shareholders' interests and that the Court was seeking
to give the corporation the same protection as its shareholders would
have received.10 2 Professor Horwitz states that the " 'natural entity'
98. Id. at 396.
99. It is far from clear what the Court meant by its statement. Graham
quotes a letter from Chief Justice Waite to the court reporter in which Waite
referring to the announcement said, "I leave it with you to determine whether
anything need be said about it in the report inasmuch as we avoided meeting the
constitutional question in the decision." Letter from Waite, CJ. to J.C.B. Davis
(May 26, 1886), quoted in H. GRAHAN, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 567 (1968). See
Comment, supra note 11, at 1464 n.64.
100. See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 174 ("real meaning of Santa Clara . . . has
not been understood").
101. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of error
dismissed as moot sub nom. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. 116 U.S. 138
(1885); Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), aff'd,
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
102. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 178. Professor Hovenkamp suggests that the
constitutional problem of corporate "personhood" was twofold. First, it involved
the preservation of the same constitutional protection of property held in the name
of a corporation as the owners of property had had in their own name. Second
was the question of standing: who could assert the constitutional rights in corporate
property? Relying on a dictum of Justice Field in his circuit court opinion in Santa
Clara, among other matters, he concludes that if the corporation had not received
1990]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
or " 'real entity' " theory was still "nowhere to be found" and that
the Court was not deciding that "the corporate entity was no different
from the individual in its constitutional entitlements." 10 3
b. Due Process of Law: Fourteenth Amendment
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania'0 4
followed two years later. Although refusing to recognize a corporation
as a "citizen" for purposes of the privileges or immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment as noted above, the Court held that
a corporation was a "person" within the meaning of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the new amendment which utilized
that term rather than the term "citizen." 10 5
Pembina does not make it clear what kind of "person" the
corporation was in being a "person" protected by the provision.
The Court was apparently not ready to conclude that the corporation
as an "artificial person" qualified as a "person" for constitutional
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. In order to support its result,
the Court also found it necessary to invoke the associational theory
asserting that "corporations are merely associations of individuals."
The Court said: "Under the designation of person [in the amend-
ment] there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special
purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name, and
have a succession of members without dissolution.'
10 6
property? Relying on a dictum of Justice Field in his circuit court opinion in Santa
Clara, among other matters, he concludes that if the corporation had not received
constitutional protection, the corporate property still would still have been protected
by the fourteenth amendment; shareholders rather than the corporation would have
been allowed to assert such claims. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1641.
The problem may not be disposed of so easily. In other areas such as the
privileges and immunities clause and the self-incrimination clause, individual rights
do not carry over to the corporation to trigger constitutional recognition of such
rights by the corporation, nor may individuals assert their rights to protect the
corporation. It is not so clear that the same result would have occurred under the
fourteenth amendment if a corporation had not been recognized as a "person"
entitled to its protection. See BLUMBERO: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10,
§ 7.08, 20.05, 28.02.
103. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 174, 223.
104. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
105. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co., 125 U.S. at 189.
106. Id. The language is borrowed from Justice Story's concurring opinion in
the Dartmouth College case. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 666.
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Eight years later in Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v.
Sandford,10 7 decided in 1896, the Court felt able to say without further
explanation: "It is now settled that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the depri-
vation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws."' 03
The Court took the final step a decade thereafter. In Southern
Railway v. Greene'° 9 decided in 1910, the Court again flatly held
"[t]hat a corporation is a person, within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, is no longer open to discussion."" 0 Southern
Railway represents the great divide. In its opinion, the Court went
on to quote the sentence in Pembina referring to the corporation as
a "person," while pointedly omitting from the quotation the suc-
ceeding sentence referring to corporations as "merely associations of
individuals." '' By so doing, the Court showed that for the first time
it was prepared to rely solely on an entity view treating the cor-
poration as a "person" without any distinction between "artificial"
and "natural" persons. The associational theory was no longer
required to support the attribution of constitutional rights to the
corporate entity.
The Court had at last moved beyond both the "weak" entity
view in its pure form, or in its reinforced form involving reliance
on both the "weak entity" and the associational theories. It had
emerged with a new "strong entity" theory. In this more developed
concept, the corporation was for the first time explicitly recognized
as a "real" entity or person, qualifying, with isolated exceptions," 2
for the same rights as natural persons under the constitutional pro-
tection of the provision accorded to a "person. ' 3 In the process,
the Court had emerged with a doctrine under which all forms of
business organizations-whether sole proprietorship, partnership, or
107. 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
108. Id. at 592. The Court relied on Santa Clara and three other decisions in
which Justice Field had written the opinion. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); Charlotte, C. & A. R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S.
386 (1882).
109. 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
110. Id. at 412.
111. Id. at 412-13. The quotation from Pembina appears four paragraphs earlier
in the text of this article. See supra text accompanying note 106.
112. See infra note 115.
113. See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 216; Schane, supra note 12, at 590.
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corporation-received very much the same constitutional protec-
tion. 114 The development of business institutions would not be dis-
torted by a pressure to adopt a particular form of business organization
in order to claim constitutional protection.
Whether a corporation is a "person" under the provisions of
the due process clause pertaining to "liberty" as distinct from "prop-
erty" is not as clear. 15
c. Self-Incrimination: Fifth Amendment
In contrast to the Court's decisions construing "person" in the
equal protection and the due process clauses to include corporations,
Hale v. Henkel," 6 decided in 1906, held that corporations were not
protected by the provision of the fifth amendment: "nor shall [any
person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... 1'117
Justice Brown, speaking for the majority, relied on the "artificial
person" theory and on state powers over corporations created by it.
He stated:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed
to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.... It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered
a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not
in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused,
and demand the production of the corporate books and
papers for that purpose."'
114. See Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal
Concept in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131 (W. Samuels
& A. Miller eds. 1987); Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate
"Person," 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 155 (1955); Horwitz, supra note 12.
115. In Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, decided in 1906, the Court stated
flatly: "The liberty referred to in [the Fourteenth] Amendment is the liberty of
natural, not artificial persons." 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). In Western Turf Ass'n,
204 U.S. at 363, the Court reaffirmed this conclusion.
However, the decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
protecting corporate freedom of speech against state action in reliance on the first
amendment incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, clearly looks the other
way. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1988).
116. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
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This markedly contrasts with Justice Brown's utilization of the as-
sociational theory to apply the unreasonable searches and seizures
clause of the fourth amendment to a corporation in the very same
case. 119
Numerous decisions have affirmed that corporations are not
protected by the self-incrimination clause.1 2 In United States v. $hite,' 2'
Justice Murphy explained the result:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is es-
sentially a personal one, applying only to natural indivi-
duals.... It is designed to prevent the use of legal process
to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence
necessary to convict him [and thereby avoid p]hysical torture
and other less violent but equally reprehensible modes of
compelling the production of incriminating evidence .... 2
d. Double Jeopardy: Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment provides: "[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... ,123 Notwithstanding the inescapable reference to natural
persons in the use of such terms as "life or limb," the Court, without
expressly deciding the issue, has repeatedly assumed the applicability
of the clause to corporations.124 Relying on such sub silentio holdings,
the lower federal courts have expressly held that corporations are
protected by the provision.
12
-
The different conclusions on the applicability to corporations of
the fifth amendment clauses pertaining to self-incrimination and
double jeopardy are particularly interesting as a textual matter. Both
119. See infra text accompanying note 131.
120. E.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Essgee Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
121. 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (trade union defendant).
122. Id. at 698.
123. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
124. E.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). Se Note, Double
Jeopardy and Corporations: "Lurking in the Record" and "Ripe for Daisrion," 28 STAN.
L. REv. 805 (1976).
125. E.g., United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332 (1st Cir.
1978); United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1970), cet.
denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977). See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note
10, § 3.06.
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clauses use the same term "person." In addition, the self-incrimi-
nation clause follows immediately after the double jeopardy clause
in the text of the fifth amendment, and, indeed, is grammatically
part of the prior clause, sharing with it the same subject, "person."
Further, the decisions applying the double jeopardy clause to
corporations are inconsistent with the decisions refusing to protect
corporations under the self-incrimination clause. The associational
theory provides no explanation of the different construction of the
two companion clauses. Nor may one contend that the existence of
corporate injury damaging to shareholders from risk of trial and
conviction justifies invocation of the double jeopardy clause. The
very same factors are insufficient to result in application of the self-
incrimination clause. 26
3. The "People"
a. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: Fourth Amendment
Hale v. Henkel not only involved the applicability to corporations
of the constitutional protection to "person[s]" against self-incrimi-
nation in the fifth amendment as discussed above, it also involved
the applicability to corporations of the constitutional protections ex-
tended to "the people" against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
in the fourth amendment. 127 Not without difficulty, the Court in Hale
v. Henke' 28 held that the term "people" protected corporations against
the production of corporate records seized under circumstances vi-
olating the provision. 29
Justice Brown relied 30 on the associational theory, asserting: "A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself
126. See, e.g., United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 252 F. Supp. 364, 368
(S.D. Cal. 1966).
127. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
128. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
129. Id. at 76. See also, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 351
U.S. 385 (1920). See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10, § 3.06.
130. The Court also emphasized the importance of the economic interests at
stake. The Court stated in further support of its conclusion: "Corporations are a
necessary feature of modem business activity, and their aggregated capital has
become the source of nearly all great enterprises." Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
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as a collective body it [the association of individuals] waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.'ut This invo-
cation of the associational theory contrasts with Justice Brown's
refusal to look beyond the artificial person view in refusing to protect
corporations under the self-incrimination clause in the very same
case. 1
32
Not all the justices accepted this view. Justice McKenna, con-
curring in the result, was more doubtful, stating: "There are certainly
strong reasons for the contention that if corporations cannot plead
the immunity of the Fifth Amendment [self-incrimination clause]
they cannot plead the immunity of the Fourth Amendment." 'H
Justice Harlan, also concurring in the result, was more positive:
"[A] corporation-'an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and ex-
isting only in contemplation of law'-cannot claim the immunity of
the Fourth Amendment; for it is not a part of the 'People' within
the meaning of that Amendment. Nor is it embraced within the
word 'Person' in the [Fifth] Amendment.' " 34
*The different results in Hale v. Henkel do not turn on the different
terminology employed, i.e., "people" in the fourth amendment and
"person" in the fifth. The Court instead upheld the applicability of
the unreasonable search and seizure clause because the rights of
shareholders against search and seizure could readily be attributed
to the corporation under the associational theory.'3 On the other
hand, refusing to protect corporations under the self-incrimination
clause in no way clashed with or eroded the personal claims of
shareholders to be protected under the clause. 136
4. General Constitutional Prohibitions on Governmental Power
The Supreme Court has considered the applicability to corpo-
rations of two constitutional provisions imposing general limitations
131. Id. The above reference to "distinct corporate entity" and the reference
to "the corporation being a creature of the state" in the discussion of the self-
incrimination clause (Hale, 201 U.S. at 74) illustrate how reliance on the "asso-
ciational" theory for attribution of constitutional rights to the corporation in no
way represents a rejection of the traditional concept that whatever its peripheral
rights, the corporation is a separate juridical entity with the universally accepted
fundamental attributes long ago set forth by Coke, Kyd, and Blackstone. See supra
notes 2-4 and accompanying text (citing to Coke, Kyd, and Blackstone).
132. Id. at 75.
133. Id, at 82.
134. Id. at 78.
135. Id. at 76.
136. Id. at 74-75.
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on governmental action: the prohibitions against impairment of con-
tracts and abridging freedom of speech or press.
a. Impairment of Contracts: Article I
The celebrated Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward case,'
decided in 1819, involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a
New Hampshire statute changing the governance structure of the
College from that provided in the original charter. While the Court
again affirmed the traditional view of the corporation as an "artificial
being" or "person" created by the State previously expressed in
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 38 it concluded that the corporate
charter was not simply a state grant or concession; it was also a
contract between the State and the incorporators.'19 Shareholder
interests were also at stake. The Court accordingly held the amen-
datory statute an unconstitutional impairment of the contract rep-
resented by the charter in violation of article 1.'40 Thus, as in Deveaux,
decided ten years earlier, the Court, while affirming the continued
vitality of entity law in determining the fundamental nature of the
corporate personality, embraced the associational view to expand the
boundaries of corporate constitutional rights. 
4
'
b. Freedom of Speech: First Amendment
The first amendment, clause 2, provides: "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." This
prohibition restrains such action by the states as well; the Court has
held that the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment binding
the states incorporates the first amendment.
4 2
137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
138. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
139. Id. at 642-44. See also Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514,
558 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[I]t is not denied, that a charter incorporating a
bank is a contract.").
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1011], cl. 5 provides: "No State shall ... pass
any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts .... "
141. This appears plainly in Justice Story's concurring opinion: "An aggregate
corporation . . . is a collection of individuals united into one collective body, under
a special name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges, and capacities in its
collective character, which do not belong to the natural persons composing it."
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667.
142. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1988).
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In First National Bank v. Bellotti,143 decided in 1978, the Court
held by a 5-4 vote that a Massachusetts statute restricting corporate
political expenditures to influence public referenda or issues, except
on matters materially affecting the corporation,'" was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the guaranty of free speech of the first
amendment. 1 4
5
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Powell stated that
the issue was a narrow one not involving theories of corporate
personality: "The proper question therefore is not whether corpo-
rations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are
coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must
be whether § 8 [of the Massachusetts statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect."'11 Justice Powell
characterized as "extreme" the conclusion of the dissenters that the
corporation was only a creature of the state possessing only those
rights granted it by the State. 47 However, he did not find it necessary
to articulate his own theory of the nature of the corporation in order
143. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
144. The statute provided: "No corporation ... shall directly or indirectly
give, pay, expend or contribute ... for the purpose of influencing or affecting the
vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting
... the property, business or assets of the corporation." Id. at 768 n.2 (quoting
Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). In Bellotti, the parties
disagreed whether the statute would have a significant effect on the appellants'
businesses. See id. at 770.
145. Id. at 795. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, ci.
2.
146. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
147. Id. at 778 n.14. However, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), Justice Powell seemed to retract this conclusion. CTS Corp.
involved the constitutionality under the commerce clause of an Indiana statute
regulating corporate take-overs and creating procedures involving difficulties and
delays for acquiring companies. While the issue did not involve the personality of
the corporation, it presented sharply the conflicting roles of state and federal law.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell said: "[S]tate regulation of corporate
governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product
of state law." Id. at 1649. Justice Powell then quoted Chief Justice Marshall's
description in the Dartmouth College case of the corporation as an "artificial being"
created by the state. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649-50 (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth
College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638). Justice Powell also pointed to the portion of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti quoting from the Dartmouth College case that
the constitutional rights of a corporation were those "incidental to its very existence."
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824. This is the very passage which he criticized as "extreme"
in Bellotti. Id. at 778 n.14.
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to dispose of the case. 14 8 Instead, he relied on the fundamental value
of "the right of public discussion" from the societal point of view'49
and he held that the corporation, as well as its officers or directors,
could not be constitutionally barred from discussion of public issues.
Justices White and Rehnquist, separately dissenting, relied on
the "weak" entity theory. Justice Rehnquist quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's well known description of the corporation as "an artificial
being" in the Dartmouth College case. He stated flatly that a corporation
had only the constitutional rights " 'incidental to its very existence'
. . . necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit
commercial corporations to exist." I o Justice White, with whom Justices
Brennan and Marshall concurred, similarly concluded: "Corporations
are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of furthering
certain economic goals. . . . The State need not permit its own
creation to consume it.'' 1 5 Four justices were thus appealing to the
"weak entity" theory.
5. Terminology or Nature of Interest
In light of the Court's inconsistent applications to corporations
of constitutional provisions, it should be apparent that the decisions
are not controlled by the terminology. Similarly, the inconsistent
utilization of conflicting theories of corporate personality indicates
that the theories are utilized to support results, rather than as guiding
principles to help reach them.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti, Justice Powell echoed the concept
of "purely personal" constitutional rights restricted to natural per-
sons, which, among others, Justice Murphy had invoked in United
States v. White.' 52 Justice Powell stated, "Whether or not a particular
[constitutional] guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to
corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history,
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision."'5 3 Hence,
"nature, history, and purpose" control. Constitutional terminology
and theories of the corporate personality-although employed to
justify the result-are not identified as important.
148. See-Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
149. Id. at 792.
150. Id. at 824-26.
151. Id. at 809.
152. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
153. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778-79 n.14.
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B. Shareholder Unanimity in State Corporation Law
When we turn from constitutional litigation to other areas of
the law, we find many references to traditional entity law in the
decisions insulating shareholders from responsibility for corporate
actions but little discussion of the nature of the corporate personality.
This should be no surprise since the discussion of corporate person-
ality to date has been concerned with the attribution of rights, not
the imposition of duties.
The associational theory of the corporation may also be seen in
the older common law insistence on unanimous stockholder approval
for certain fundamental corporate changes, such as merger or dis-
solution or sale of all, or substantially all, the assets of the business.
These events are perceived as departures from the contract among
shareholders underlying the foundation of the corporation and, there-
fore, require the consent of all contracting parties.15 While this
requirement for unanimity has vanished for most purposes, other
vestiges of the "contract" principle remain to this day. Examples
include the doctrine of "waste" and the elimination of preferred
stock dividend arrearages by charter amendment.
Under the doctrine of waste, corporate expenditures are invalid
unless supported by some rational basis for concluding that the
challenged corporate expenditure will in some way benefit the cor-
poration and accordingly not represent a gift of corporate assets.' 5
154. See, e.g., Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890); State
ex rel. Brown v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46 (1861); McCray v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358
(1857); Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. App. Div.
1861); Stevens v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 29 Vt. 545 (1851), collerted in Horitz,
supra note 12, at 201 n.139. See also V. MoRAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAWJ OF
PRIVATE COPORATIONS iii (2d ed. 1886).
155. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.34 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1986) ("A transaction constitutes a 'waste of corporate assets' if its terms
are such that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the
consideration received by the corporation was a fair exchange for what was received
by the corporation"). See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Dcl. 1979):
The essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion of
corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes. Although directors
are given wide latitude in making business judgments, they are bound to
act out of fidelity and honesty in their roles as fiduciaries [of the minority
shareholders] .... It is common sense that a transfer for no consideration
amounts to a gift or waste of corporate assets.
Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
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In the absence of unanimous shareholder approval, waste is barred
by contemporary law.'56
Another illustration was the requirement until recently in Del-
aware corporation law for the unanimous approval of preferred share-
holders of an amendment of the certificate of incorporation eliminating
dividend arrearages on preferred shares in the face of a statutory
provision authorizing charter amendments by two-thirds vote.,,
However, the significance of this decision was promptly undermined
by the readiness of the Delaware courts to allow such action through
a merger with a subsidiary organized for this purpose, which requires
only majority vote.'5 s It was subsequently overruled by statute.'
Shareholder power in these instances ultimately rests on the
theory that the challenged action violates a fundamental understand-
ing for the benefit of shareholders embodied in the original act of
incorporation. They represent clear reflections of the associational
theory of the corporation. 60 It should be noted, however, that these
matters relate to the internal governance of the corporation and to
the allocation of corporate decision-making authority between the
directors and the shareholders. Neither involves the corporation's
dealings with the larger world. Accordingly, they have limited use-
fulness in an examination of different theories of the corporate per-
sonality.
156. Although waste resembles the "ultra vires" problem, its essential difference
is that state interests as reflected in a narrow construction of the corporate charter
are not concerned at all.
In the area of corporate charitable contributions, the modern law defers more
to the business judgment of the board of directors of the corporation recognizing
indirect or long term benefit as sufficient while the older cases insisted on direct,
short-term benefit. See Blumberg, Corporations and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REv.
157 (1970).
157. E.g., Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Oh. 391, 413, 190 A. 115, 125
(Del. 1936) (statutory power authorizing shareholder amendment of charters did
not permit amendment cancelling preferred stock accrued unpaid dividends) (over-
ruled by subsequent statute); Davison v. Parke, Austin, Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y.
500, 505, 35 N.E.2d 618, 623 (1941) (overruled by subsequent statute).
158. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Oh. 318, 330-31, 11 A.2d
331, 338 (Del. 1940).
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(4) (1983 repl. vol.); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW § 801(a)(12) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 10.01(b) (1990).
See I E. FOLK, R. WARD, & E. WELCH, DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 242.5, 242.8 (2d ed. 1988).
160. See FOLK, WARD, & WELCH, supra note 159, § 242.2.
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C. "Piercing the Veil Jurisprudence"
With the recognition of limited liability for constituent corpo-
rations comprising a corporate group, inevitable tensions developed
between the traditional legal view of each corporation as a separate
legal entity and the economic reality that all of the constituent
corporations of the group comprised a single firm, typically engaged
in the collective conduct of a single integrated worldwide enterprise,
whose activities had been fragmented among the companies com-
prising the group. Inevitably, the doctrine of the corporation as a
separate and distinct entity, reinforced by the principle of limited
liability under which shareholders are insulated from liability for
corporate obligations, led in some cases to results that, however
conceptually sound under the theory of entity law, were unacceptable
to the courts in the particular case before them. The law required
a safety valve.
The doctrine of "piercing" or "lifting" the veil, or disregard
of entity in "exceptional" cases, first emerged in cases of controlled
corporations and controlling individual shareholders. It subsequently
was lifted bodily and applied to cases involving corporate groups as
well, without any awareness that very different economic and social
problems were involved. Courts drew no distinction between the
insulation of limited liability to protect investors in a business and
its use to create multiple layers of such protection in the complex
multi-tiered corporate group protecting the parent and sub-holding
companies against liability for obligations of the subsidiaries although
all were collectively engaged in the conduct of a common business.
Thus, cases adapting "piercing the veil jurisprudence" to cor-
porate groups constitute the raw material out of which American
enterprise law, or the law of corporate groups, is beginning to
emerge. 161 In addition to such essentially episodic and incremental
judicial developments, American statutory law has widely (although
not exclusively) enacted varying enterprise definitions effectively ex-
tending the scope of statutory regulatory programs from a constituent
company of a corporate group to the parent corporation and sub-
holding companies of the group and in some cases to the sister
subsidiaries as well.
161. This development is reviewed in the author's volumes in the series con-
stituting The Law of Corporate Groups to which readers are referred. See supra notes
8, 10, 38, 39 & 40.
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"Piercing the veil jurisprudence" and statutory enterprise law
are being comprehensively discussed in the author's series of volumes
on The Law of Corporate Groups. The scale of the topic has already
led to the publication of four volumes in the Series dealing with
such matters in the areas of procedure, bankruptcy, common law
disputes (particularly contracts, torts, property, and conflict of laws),
and federal statutes of general application. Several additional volumes
remain to be written. This article will seek to do no more than
explore their implications for newer dimensions in formulations of
the corporate personality and for the development of enterprise law.
D. Relation of Entity Law to Corporate Rights and Duties and to
Limited Liability
It is essential to distinguish between the recognition of the
corporation as a separate juridical unit, 62 and an identification of
the various legal rights and duties that may be attributed to or
imposed upon corporations in various areas of the law.
As a separate juridical unit, a corporation has its own legal
capacity, without the participation of shareholders or any other legal
person, to assert certain fundamental rights and to bear certain
duties; 63 further, shareholders have no legal standing to assert the
rights of the corporation.
In the early days of the law, well before the American Revo-
lution, the development of this concept of the corporation as a separate
juridical unit included the recognition of the fundamental "core"
rights already enumerated: the capacity to sue and be sued; the right
to hold and transfer property; and the right of perpetual existence-
all without regard to its changing membership-and, in addition, the right
of shareholders to transfer their shares without any effect on corporate
existence.'64 The American legal system adopted this traditional view.
162. In view of the increasing interest in the extent to which the use of the
term "person" and the development of a concept of "personhood" have influenced
the development of the law in the constitutional area, reference to the corporate
"person" is better avoided. "Entity" is no better because it has become a conclusory
expression representing a different approach than "enterprise" in the analysis, of
the interrelationship of the corporate constituents of a corporate group to the group.
What term should then be used? "Corporate juridical unit" is not elegant but at
least does not present the foregoing difficulties.
163. As Maitland put it, the corporation is a "right-and-duty-bearing" legal
unit. See 3 MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 307, 314-15.
164. See supra notes 2-4.
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In the subsequent development of the law, a case-by-case resolution
of the conflicting interests before them led courts to consider whether
additional rights should also be attributed to the corporation. The
universally accepted "core" rights of the corporations remained un-
challenged; the issue was whether other rights should be attributed
as well. In this resolution, concepts of the corporate personality "in
the heads of the judges" obviously influenced their thinking, but
dearly did not lead to any ultimate conclusion as an inexorable
logical deduction from the concept.
Thus, in the case of the recognition of the constitutional rights
of a corporation, the corporation's status as a juridical unit enabled
it to qualify for the protection of many constitutional provisions.
However, such recognition of the status of the corporation for certain
purposes did not result in automatic qualification for constitutional
protection of the corporation to the same extent as a natural person.
The application of each constitutional provision to the corporation
was a matter of interpretation and development in the light of the
nature of the corporate interest being asserted, the history of the
particular provision, and its purpose in the light of the constitutional
jurisprudence of the time. 165 Competing theories of the nature of the
corporate personality influenced such developments, but the process
reflected a struggle over competing values and interests, a struggle
in which the status of the corporation as a separate juridical unit
was not determinative. The status of the corporation as a separate
entity merely set the stage for resolution of the legal questions about
the nature of additional corporate constitutional and other legal rights
and duties and of shareholders' liability for corporate obligations. It
did not answer them.
Similarly, recognition of the corporation as a separate entity
distinct from its shareholders did not inevitably mean that share-
holders were not, directly or indirectly, liable for corporate debts.
On the contrary, both direct shareholder liability for corporate debts
and indirect shareholder liability through liability for assessments or
leviations' 66 to provide the funds required for the payment of corporate
debts continued until long after the separate personality of the cor-
poration had been firmly recognized. 6 Eventually, statutory change,
165. See Belotti, 435 U.S. at 778-79 n.14 (Powell, J.); supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
166. BLUMBERG: SUBsrANTIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 38, § 1.03.1, 1.04.1,
1.04.2.
167. See id. at ch. 1; Blumberg, Limited Liabili!y, supra note 1.
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not judicial decision, was required to bring about limited liability.,,,
E. Summary
Discussion of the nature of the corporate personality flourished
for decades before it was at last set in perspective by Professor John
Dewey in 1926.169 Professor Dewey dismissed the debate as an ac-
ademic exercise without larger reality. He emphasized that corporate
rights and liabilities were the product of the law and that the legal
implications or meaning of the corporation was "whatever the law
makes it mean. ' 170 Thereafter until the rise of the libertarians a half
century later, discussion of the nature of the corporate personality
languished.
Dewey's view does not do justice to all aspects of the problem.
First, in the law, concepts have a life of their own because of their
ability ex ante to influence the thinking of judges and ex post to be
invoked by judges to justify their conclusions. These aspects of judicial
decision making have clearly been evident in the judicial treatment
of corporate personality in the constitutional cases reviewed above.'
Second, the use of particular language has a cultural force of its
own. Identification of the corporation as a "person" may start as
a metaphor, 72 but its usage gives rise to an association of the
attributes of a person and those of the corporation. Indeed, the use
of the term arises because of the plausibility of such an association. 73
Finally, in neither the cases nor the discussion has there been
any attempt to look upon the corporation as anything other than a
168. E.g., Act of Feb. 23, 1830, ch. 53, § 8, 1830 Mass. Acts 325, 329;
Limited Liability Act, 1855, 17 & 19 Vict. ch. 133 (1855); andJoint Stock Companies
Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. ch. 47 (1856).
169. Dewey, supra note 12.
170. Id. at 656. Bryant Smith aptly made this the distinction between the
status of the corporation as a separate juridical unit and the various rights-
constitutional and otherwise-accorded to it by the law. He stated:
It is not the part of legal personality to dictate conclusions. To insist that
because it has been decided that a corporation is a legal person for some
purposes it must therefore be a legal person for all purposes, . . . is to
make of . . . corporate personality . . . a master rather than a servant,
and to decide legal questions on irrelevant considerations without inquiry
into their merits. Issues do not properly turn upon a name.
Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE LJ. 283, 298 (1928) (footnote omitted). See also
Comment, supra note 12, at 1479.
171. Professor Horwitz similarly concludes that legal conceptions "do have
'tilt' or influence in determining outcomes." See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 176.
172. See Machen, supra note 12, at 263.
173. See Schane, supra note 12, at 594-95.
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separate juridical entity, separate from its shareholders, possessing
its traditional "core" attributes recognized long ago. Each of the
theories of the nature of the corporation that has been advanced in
the United States has accepted entity law without challenge. Where
debate about various theories of the nature of the corporate person-
ality has played a lively role, it has been about the constitutional
rights to be accorded to the corporate entity in addition to such
"core" common law rights. Whatever the theory utilized to support
the outcome or the constitutional rights attributed to the corporation
or the shareholder interests recognized in such attribution, the tra-
ditional concept of entity law has remained unimpaired. The debate
has related only to the details of the superstructure erected on a
universally accepted foundation.
Among its other limitations, this debate over corporate rights
has ignored the profound economic and political developments of
the past century: the emergence of corporate groups as well as the
increasingly important question of corporate duties. We now consider
the emergence of corporate groups since the "turning point in Amer-
ican business history" when New Jersey 100 years ago amended its
corporation laws and for the first time permitted corporations gen-
erally to acquire and hold stock of other corporations and thus
organize corporate groups.
174
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE
GROUPS
The extended American discussion of the nature of the corporate
personality has overwhelmingly turned on an abstract consideration
of the legal and philosophical interrelationships of a corporation and
its shareholders. This discussion has been on a rarified level viewing
the corporation and its investor-shareholders as stereotypes. Cor-
porations have been assumed to be essentially equivalent to each
other. The corporation has been seen as the equivalent of the firm
conducting the enterprise, and the shareholders as investors not
174. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISToRY
OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 30 (1962). Se also Act of Apr. 4, 1888,
ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 17, 1888, ch. 295, § 1, 1888 NJ.
Laws 445; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, § 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412; Act of Mar.
14, 1893, ch. 171, § 2, 1893 N.J. Laws § 301.
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engaged in the conduct of any portion of the enterprise for their
direct personal account. 17
5
This view accurately described the simple corporate structure
characteristic of the early days of the Republic before the emergence
of the modern corporation. However, over the last 100 years in
which the law has generally permitted the organization of corporate
groups without express authorization by statute or special charter,
this model has become increasingly unhelpful and should be discarded
as archaic.
The traditional concept of the corporation as a separate juridical
unit clashes violently with reality when applied, not merely to simple
corporations with shares owned by individual investors, but to cor-
porations that are members of a corporate group. In such cases, the
"corporation" and the enterprise are no longer identical. The en-
terprise is no longer being conducted solely by a single corporation
but collectively by the coordinated activities of numerous interrelated
corporations under common control. The law thus asserts that Mobil
Oil Corporation consists of hundreds of separate and distinct
corporations 176 while the economic reality is that it is a single en-
terprise. 17 7 Recognizing this reality, economists are concerned, not
with the corporation, but with the firm or the enterprise. In their
analysis corporate legal structures are not merely unimportant; they
are irrelevant.
In the world today, economic activity in the developed countries
is overwhelmingly dominated by very large corporations, 7 ' typically
175. Although in the small corporation shareholders may be managers as well
as major investors, this does not tend to occur in the large corporations which
dominate the economic society although the recent trend to leveraged management
buyouts may herald a change. Further, even where the major investor manages,
he or she is participating in the conduct of the corporation's business, not his or her
own.
176. See BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at 465, at Table 5 (Mobil had
512 majority owned and 13 less than majority owned subsidiaries in 1982).
177. Such modem doctrines as product liability in tort and "stream of com-
merce" in jurisdiction to adjudicate illustrate how strong social pressures may lead
the law to develop doctrines resting on economic interrelationships. Thus, in these
areas, the imposition of liability or assertion of jurisdiction has even moved beyond
direct participation in the activity complained of, or even the parent-subsidiary
relationship and "piercing the veil jurisprudence," to rest on participation at an
earlier stage in the economic activity in question even when conducted by parties
unrelated by ownership or control to the defendant. See BLUMBERO: PROCEDURE,
supra note 8, § 5.12a (1989 Supp.); BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW, supra
note 38, at ch. 13.
178. See STAT. ABSTR. OF U.S., Tables Nos. 884, 885 (1989); N.Y. STOCK
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conducting worldwide businesses often through "incredibly complex"
structures of holding companies, sub-holding companies, subsidiaries,
and affiliates, involving scores, if not hundreds or even a thousand,
of constituent corporations. 7 9 An examination of the corporation that
is not concerned with the significance of such corporate groups is
largely irrelevant. While a parent corporation is indeed the share-
holder of its subsidiaries, it differs radically from the original share-
holder in the older stereotype. Unlike the shareholder-investors in
the simple corporation, or the public shareholder-investors in the
modern parent corporation, the parent corporation is typically not
a passive investor. Instead, it is a major part of the enterprise,
engaged along with its subsidiaries in the collective conduct of a
common business under centralized control; in brief, the parent and
subsidiaries constitute a group. The parent company's relationship
to the subsidiary corporations of which it holds the shares is pro-
foundly different from that of public shareholder-investors.'C
Any examination of the relationship of the corporation law to
the contemporary corporate world must accordingly concern itself
with the legal problems presented by corporate groups to deal with
the important issues that contemporary major business presents for
the legal order. A new model must be devised that accurately reflects
the modern enterprise. We must examine the significance of inter-
related corporations functioning under common control to determine
whether in the particular case, the rights or duties of the parent
corporation are so affected by the activities of the subsidiary that
the law should consider the corporations constituting the enterprise
as the appropriate legal unit for recognition of rights and duties. In
any such analysis, it is essential that a central role be given to review
of the economic integration of the enterprise being conducted by the
Exch. Fact Book 78 (1986). Compounding such concentration, the largest cor-
porations have grown considerably in size in the years between 1970-1986.
179. See Hadden, supra note 9, at 273. The author's 1982 survey indicated
that 1,000 largest American corporations had an average of 48 subsidiaries each.
The very largest, of course, had many more, averaging 189 each. Sfe BLUMBERO:
PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at 464-68, at Table 5.
180. With respect to investment in new business opportunities, particularly
in a different industry (that is, the so-called conglomerate group), the group
may present problems with respect to limited liability, risk evaluation, and
entrepreneurial risktaking resembling those presented by the simple corporation
and its individual shareholders.
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affiliated corporations to determine whether the related corporations
are collectively conducting an enterprise that has been fragmented
among the component companies of the corporate group.'18
In brief, in order to deal realistically with the major actors on
the corporate scene today, the corporate group, whether described
as the "controlled group," or as the "enterprise," or as the "ec-
onomic entity," must be the focus of any study of the modern
corporate entity.
V. CORPORATE ENTITY, CONTROLLED GROUP, OR ECONOMIC
ENTITY?
The challenge for legal systems the world over is the adaptation
of corporation law to reflect these economic realities with the de-
velopment of doctrines to supplement or replace entity law. The
thousands of decisions in the United States courts involving "piercing
the veil jurisprudence"' 82 should leave no doubt as to the intensity
of the problem for the legal system. Similarly, the much criticized,
irreconcilable, and unpredictable nature of such decisions18 3 should
leave no doubt as to the fundamental inadequacy of traditional entity
law to deal with the problems presented by the new corporate world.
181. Such fragmentation is common as part of programs to achieve tax, ac-
counting, exchange control, political and public relations, and other objectives of
the group, as well as to limit liability.
182. The tables of cases in the four volumes of the series on The Law of
Corporate Groups published to date include approximately 5,500 decisions. Most of
the cases cited involve "piercing the veil" although a significant number involve
other matters.
Many, if not most, of the "piercing the veil cases" involve simple corporations
owned by individual controlling stockholders. However, an increasing number in-
volve corporate groups.
183. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 136, at 312 (rev. ed. 1946) ("The
formulae invoked usually give no guidance or basis for understanding the results
reached."); E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 157-58 (1936)
("[N]o help is to be derived from the multitude of meaningless, though undeniably
picturesque, epithets which have been applied to corporations whenever the court
has felt . . . that the corporate device was being used in ways or circumstances
which the court did not sanction.").
Further, the conceptual standards of entity law are frequently regarded as
universal principles and applied indiscriminately across the entire range of the law.
Courts applying "piercing the veil jurisprudence" frequently rely on such decisions
arising in very different areas of the law. See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON
LAW, supra note 38, § 6.01; Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979,




The time is ripe for consideration of alternate doctrinal ap-
proaches to rectify the inadequacies of entity law as applied to
corporate groups. The various concepts developed thus far in the
American judicial decisions and governmental regulatory programs
involving corporate groups provide the obvious starting point for
suggesting standards that might most effectively serve such a purpose.
Of the standards already utilized in American law, "control," "uni-
tary business," "integrated enterprise," and "economic integration"
are the most prominent. "Enterprise" itself serves as a standard in
isolated American statutes, but not in a particularly useful context.
We must inquire into the extent to which each of the foregoing
concepts might effectively provide a satisfactory unifying standard to
serve as the legal foundation for regarding two or more separate but
affiliated corporations as constituting a single actor,.for certain legal
purposes. Each of these will be briefly reviewed in the light of the
American decisions and statutes from which it has emerged.'"'
A. "Control"
In many areas of United States law, particularly in statutory
law, "control" has provided an effective and workable standard for
assigning to controlling parties, and frequently to parties under com-
mon control as well, important legal consequences by reason of the
actions of controlled parties.
1. "Control" as a Statutory Standard
Where the standard of "control" as the basis for imposing duties
and obligations on parent corporations, and sometimes on corpo-
rations affiliated under common control as well, means only the
existence of "control," the concept permits ready definition and easy
application. This is particularly true of corporate groups, where the
existence of "control" is virtually self-evident as a result of the extent
of stock ownership and with the parent inevitably designating the
boards of directors of the group subsidiaries. The essence of a cor-
porate group is that the constituent companies are not only affiliated
by stock ownership but also operate under common control. It is
184. Let us defer for the moment the fundamental issue whether any alternate
doctrine should replace entity law entirely, or whether it should have the more
limited objective of supplementing traditional concepts with a new legal standard
for the attribution of legal duties and obligations of one entity within a corporate
group to affiliates conducting with it a common business under common control.
1990]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
the ability of the group to coordinate and to integrate the operations
and resources of the controlled constituent companies for the benefit
of the group as a whole"8 5 that is primarily responsible for the
corporate group's development into the prevailing business institution
of our time.'16
Thus, insofar as corporate groups are concerned, the existence
of "control" may be assumed. The precise extent of the exercise of
"control" in the individual case-where deemed relevant-would
depend on the extent of centralization or decentralization within the
particular group. This would, of course, require individual investi-
gation. However, in the corporate group with the parent controlling
the subsidiaries' boards, the extent of centralization or decentrali-
zation represents no more than a tactical decision of the moment as
to management techniques. Subservience to group objectives will
always remain paramount.
In the Securities Act of 1933,187 the Congress first enacted a
defined standard of "control" that has been utilized in numerous
later statutes, frequently regulating the prices, services, issuance of
securities, entry, and transfers of control of firms in a designated
industry. Such statutes include the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,18"
the Federal Communications Act of 1934,189 the Interstate Commerce
Act, 190 and the Federal Power Act.' 9' In such statutes, use of a
standard of "control" extends the scope of the statutory regulatory
program beyond the controlled corporation conducting the regulated
activity in question to:
any corporation controlling it, controlled by it, or under
common control.
185. In the case of partly-owned subsidiaries, this economic objective is some-
what restricted by fiduciary obligations of fairness with respect to transactions
between the parent corporation and such subsidiaries. However, these standards
are loose and not particularly effective. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
186. See 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 141-
50 (1970). See also J. VAN HORNE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 496-
502 (2d ed. 1974) (multinational corporations). But see Blake, Conglomerate Mergers
and the Antitrust Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 571-72 (1973).
187. 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(3) (1982).
188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(18), (12)(b)(1) (1982). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)
(1982).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 219(a) (1982).
190. 49 U.S.C. § 310 (1982).
191. 16 U.S.C. 5 825c (1982).
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In other words, "control" transforms the statutory scope from entity
law to enterprise law and sweeps under the enactment the entire
corporate group whenever any constituent company is subject to its
provisions.
There are two important limitations on the significance of the
statutory experience. First, the standard of "control" is being used
only to expand the concept of the legal entity to embrace the corporate
group for the specfic purposes of the statute. It in no sense seeks to
replace entity law as a whole. Second, each of these statutes deals
with a carefully limited area of the economy where use of a standard
such as "control" is deemed essential to achieve full implementation
of the statutory regulatory program, to prevent frustration of the
statutory objectives, and to prevent ready evasion of the statute
through the organization of subsidiary companies. 1' Whether such
a standard might serve as usefully in other areas of law or as a
complete substitute for entity law is quite another matter.
If the "control" standard relates to the exercise, not merely the
existence, of control, the standard loses some of its simplicity and ease
of application, requiring case-by-case determination. However, as
noted, the exercise of control is self-evident in the case of corporate
groups; accordingly, the problem will virtually never arise.
2. Definitions of "Control"
There are two patterns in the statutory definitions of "control"
in its traditional meaning pertaining to control over the decision-
making processes of a corporation. One involves reliance on nu-
merical benchmarks, either as the statutory standard or as establishing
presumptions on whether the statutory standard, however expressed,
has been satisfied. The other carefully avoids all numerical standards
and relies on a functional, pragmatic standard turning on the "re-
ality" of control. In addition to definitions employing "control"
with its traditional meaning, "control" has become so accepted as
the standard for referring to a specified degree of affiliation between
192. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 10, § 2.05.4.
The United Kingdom labor relations and employment discrimination experience
provides two dramatic illustrations of the type of frustration and evasion possible
under regulatory statutes not including such a standard for application to constituent
companies of corporate groups. See Dimbleby & Sons Ltd. v. National Union of
Journalists, 1 W.L.R. 67 (1984); Haughton v. Olau Line (UK) Ltd., 1986 I.C.R.
504 (C.A.). See also BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10, 5 2.05.4,
13.06, 14.13.6.
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corporations that the term has in some cases lost its traditional
meaning. Other statutes have used it, although giving it a content
requiring factors in addition to control over the decision-making
process.
First, many statutes contain numerical definitions of control,
often supplemented by statutory presumptions about the extent to
which ownership of a minority of voting stock of a regulated cor-
poration will be deemed to represent "control" for purposes of the
statute.193 The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 thus utilizes five
percent stock ownership as a benchmark to establish a rebuttable
presumption and twenty-five percent to establish a conclusive pre-
sumption of control. 94 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 provides that ten percent creates a rebuttable presumption of
control. 95 The Investment Company Act of 1940 uses twenty-five
percent to establish a rebuttable presumption of control. 196 It should
be noted that these statutes also utilize the same functional, and
pragmatic definition of control to supplement their presumptions.
They refer to the power "directly or indirectly [to] exercise[] a
controlling influence over the management or policies" of another
company. 97
State corporation statutes, content with a less inclusive standard
in order to achieve certainty, typically employ definitions referring
to ownership of a majority of the voting shares or a majority of the
shares entitled to vote for the election of the members of the board
of directors of the corporation. 98 The Internal Revenue Code widely
employs numerical standards to determine corporate affiliation. How-
ever, while it uses the term "control," as we will see, the provisions
are also concerned with the extent of common proprietary interest,
a factor playing no direct role in the traditional statutory standards
of "control."
Second, other statutes, such as the Federal Communications Act
of 1934 and Transportation Act of 1940, carefully avoid numerical
193. E.g., Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1982);
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)-(9) (1982); Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a)(2)(A), (3) (1982).
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)(3) (1982).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1982).
196. 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-2(a)(9) (1982).
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(C) (1982); 15 U.S.C. §§ 79b(B), 80(a)-2(a)(9)
(1982). Cf 1933 Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1988).
198. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.21(b) (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE § 189
(West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 160(c) (1983 repl. vol.).
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standards and utilize a "broad" definition of "control."'5 Thus,
the Transportation Act of 1940 provided that "control"
shall be construed to include actual as well as legal control,
whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of
the method of or circumstances surrounding organization
or operation, through or by common directors, officers, or
stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a holding or investment
company or companies, or through or by any other direct
or indirect means; and to include the power to exercise
control. 200
In the Revised Interstate Commerce Act, this definition of "con-
trol" in the Transportation Act of 1940 was amended to read:
" '[C]ontrol' . . . includes actual control, legal control, and the power
to exercise control, through or by (A) common directors, officers,
stockholders, a voting trust, or a holding or investment company,
or (B) any other means. 20 1
In the Securities Act of 1933, joint and several liability, subject
to certain exculpatory provisions, is imposed on: "Every person who,
by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pur-
suant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with
one or more persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise controls any person liable under section 11 or 12 ''2
Securities Act Rule 405, dealing with the registration of securities,
defines "control" for the latter purpose to mean:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling",
"controlled by," and "under common control with") means
the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise.20 3
199. See Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 125 (1962).
200. 54 Stat. 899-900 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(b) (1976), supmdttd by 49
U.S.C. § 10102(7) (1982).201. 49 U.S.C. 9 10102(7) (1982).
202. 1933 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
203. 1933 Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1989). The same definition is
employed in 1934 Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b(2) (1989), and Accounting
Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02. Professor Loss concludes that the definitions adopted
for purposes of registration or qualification "presumably apply by analogy" in other
contexts. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 395 n.8 (2d ed.
1988).
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Finally, still other statutes omit any statutory definition of control
in order to block or impede attempts at statutory evasion and leave
it to the agency administering the statute to formulate and reformulate
sophisticated definitions of "control" in the light of the regulatory
experience with the particular industry or activity. 20 4
Internal Revenue Code section 482 departs from the general
pattern of the Code utilizing mathematical benchmarks of stock
ownership to define corporate affiliation. Section 482 also follows the
traditional statutory approach to "control." Dealing with tax abuse
through the manipulation of intragroup transactions, section 482
gives sweeping authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to reallocate income, deductions, credits, or allowances between re-
lated parties "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the[ir]
income. "
Like the securities acts, section 482 defines "control" in the
most general terms, leaving detailed definition to administrative reg-
ulation. The statute merely applies to transactions between "two or
more organizations, trades, or businesses . . . owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests .... "205
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
neither section 482 nor the regulations define the crucial statutory
term-"the same interests"-except in terms of the "reality" of
control.2 0 6 In dealing with "control," the Treasury Regulations pro-
ceed in very much the same manner as the federal regulatory statutes
and regulations reviewed above. Avoiding reliance on any precise
mathematical test that could serve as a blueprint for evasion, the
regulations refer in general, inclusive terms to define "control" to
include: "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally
enforceable, and however exerciseable or exercised. It is the reality
of control, which is decisive, not its form or mode of exercise. A
presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been
arbitrarily shifted.' '207
204. Thus, in the case of the securities acts, the Congress "believ[ed] that
strict definitions of control would be 'undesirable' because it 'would be difficult if
not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which control may
be exerted.' " H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934), cited in Metge
v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers
Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
205. I.R.C. § 482 (1989).
206. See B. Forman & Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1153 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1973).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (1989).
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The foregoing definitions of "control" have been analyzing the
term in a precise functional sense, concerned with the matters un-
derscored in Securities Act Rule 405-'"the power to direct or cause
the direction of the management and policies" of the related cor-
poration. However, the term "control" has become so recognized
in American usage as establishing affiliation between corporations
that it has been used in statutes with meanings that are very different
from this functional usage. While the same term has been used, it
has broadened and acquired a new, more demanding content than
control over the decision-making process. For application of such
statutory provisions, additional standards are imposed as well. Thus,
in the 1984 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act and in numerous instances in the Internal Revenue Code, except
for section 482 discussed above, the statutory definitions of "control"
require more than mere control over management decision-making.
The 1984 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) seeking to give the Act extraterritorial application to
Americans employed by foreign subsidiaries of United States-based
multinational corporations thus depart from the prevailing patterns
and employ a unique approach. As amended, ADEA, which utilizes
a standard of "control," defines "control" functionally, incorpo-
rating in haec verba the four-factor "integrated enterprise" standard
developed by the National Labor Relations Board and adopted by
the courts to determine when affiliated corporations constitute a
"single employer" for jurisdictional and certain other purposes under
the federal labor relations2P and employment discrimination20 sta-
tutes.
The 1984 amendments provide:
(g)(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place
of incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice by
such corporation prohibited under this section shall be pre-
sumed to be the practice by such employer.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination
of whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based
upon the-
(A) interrelation of operations,
208. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 10, §5 13.03, 13.04.
209. Id. § 14.03.
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(B) common management,
(C) centralized control of labor relations, and
(D) common ownership or financial control,
of the employer and the corporation. 21 0
In view of the increased pressures for greater operational dis-
cretion that geography necessarily exerts in the case of foreign sub-
sidiaries, the utilization of such a functional standard rather than
reliance on a benchmark employing a specified percentage of stock
ownership gives the statute a less sweeping extraterritorial effect than
might at first appear.
In the Internal Revenue Code, there are numerous sections
providing for different tax treatment of certain transactions between
stock-linked corporations. By their terms, these provisions become
applicable upon establishment of the existence of "control," as de-
fined. In all, there are no less than ten differing major definitions
of "control" in the Code for the purposes of the particular sections
in issue. All but one of these utilize a mathematical benchmark of
stock ownership-sometimes 80%, sometimes 50.01%, sometimes
50.00% .21' None, however, applies the benchmark solely to voting
stock, the factor related to control over the decision-making process. 212
210. Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(h)
(Supp. vol., 1987).
211. Sections requiring 80% of voting stock or voting power include: I.R.C.
368(c), 582(b), 1504(a)(2), 1551(b), 1563 (1989).
Sections referring to 80% of "total value" or "total number" or to "each
class" of stock as an additional requirement include: §5 368(c) ("total value"),
562(b) ("each class"), 1504(a)(2) ("total value") (1989).
Sections referring to 80% of "total value" of stock as an alternative standard
include: §§ 1551, 1563 (1989).
The only section requiring 50% of both "voting power" and "total value" is
I.R.C. § 246A (1989). It requires "at least 50 percent," that is 50.00%.
Sections referring to either 50% of "voting power" or "total value" include:
I.R.C. §§ 246A, 267, 269, 304, 957 (1989). Sections 267 and 957 refer to "more
than 50 percent," that is 50.01%. Sections 246A, 269, and 304 refer to "at least
50 percent," that is 50.00%.
The foregoing provisions cut a much wider swathe than may be apparent
because they are incorporated into other sections as well. Thus, the standard of
§ 1504(a)(2), for example, applies not only to the consolidated returns sections of
which it is a part, but also to §§ 243(a)(5), 332(b)(1), 336(e)(1), 337(b)(1), and
864(e) as well.
212. The regulations under § 537 provide one exception. Section 537 regulations
impose a penalty tax on the unreasonable accumulation of earnings beyond the
"reasonable needs of the business." In response to the question of whether a
parent's accumulation may be justified by reference to the needs of a subsidiary,
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Each applies its benchmark, either as an additional standard to be
met or as an alternative standard, to include certain nonvoting shares
as well. 213 Thus, although the term "control" is being used, it is
apparent that a substantial identity of proprietary ownership, un-
related to direction of management, is also being used as a standard.
In these sections, "control" over management alone is not the
standard of "control" although it will, no doubt, turn out to be
present in almost all cases.
3. The Role of Administrative Agencies in Determinations of
"Control"
Administrative agencies play a major role in the implementation
of these regulatory programs. Through their rule-making power and
their adjudicatory powers, the agencies formulate a vast body of law
and practice supplementing the statutes. This process is particularly
evident in the case of administrative determinations of "control."
In the Rochester case, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the
importance of administrative adjudications of control, holding that
they were determinations of "fact," resting not on mathematical
standards, but on all the circumstances in the particular case and
that such decisions of the agency were conclusive so long as supported
by substantial evidence in the record.214
As illustrated by the following examples, various agencies have
employed different formulations of "control." Thus, for purposes of
the First War Powers Act regulating exports in time of war and
national emergency, the Office of Foreign Assets Controls, in the
absence of any formal rule or regulation, construed "control" gen-
erally to include "any type of control, actual or potential." It con-
cluded that fifty percent ownership of voting common stock, or a
Treasury Regulation § 1.537-3(b) provides that a single business is involved for
this purpose (and accumulation proper) when a parent corporation owns 80% of
the voting stock of the subsidiary. While the standard solely involves voting stock,
the use of a benchmark far above the amount of stock required for election of the
board of directors-the ultimate standard for control-indicates that this provision,
too, is concerned with the extent of common proprietary interest.
It should be noted that the regulation establishes a conclusive presumption,
but somewhat smaller holdings may also be found acceptable after examination on
a case-by-case basis.
213. Traditional non-voting preferred shares with limited dividend and liqui-
dation rights are generally excluded, but the provisions are far from uniform.
214. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939).
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lesser amount where there were no other large blocks would constitute
control.2 15
The anti-boycott regulatory controls2 6 under the Export Control
Act of 1969217 and the Export Administration Act of 197928 apply
to foreign subsidiaries or affiliates "controlled in fact" by United
States corporations or persons. The Regulations elaborately define
"controlled in fact" to mean "the authority or ability of a domestic
concern to establish the general policies or to control "day-to-day
operations" of its "foreign subsidiary . . . affiliate . . . or other...
establishment.' '29 The definition is supported by a number of re-
buttable presumptions. These include voting control where the "do-
mestic concern beneficially owns or controls (whether directly or
indirectly) more than fifty percent of the outstanding voting securities
of the foreign subsidiary or affiliate; ' 220 or "twenty-five percent or
more . . . if no other person owns or controls (whether directly or
indirectly) an equal or larger percentage. '221
Other circumstances under the Export Administration Act giving
rise to a rebuttable presumption of "controlled in fact" include cases
where the domestic concern operates the foreign concern under an
exclusive management contract; 222 where the same individuals com-
prise a majority of the boards of directors of the domestic concern
and the foreign subsidiary or affiliate; 223 or where the domestic
concern has the authority to appoint the majority of the board or
the chief executive officer of the foreign subsidiary or affiliate. 2 4
It will be readily seen that all standards of "control" include
the power to direct the decision-making of the board of directors.
The courts and agencies, however, have not restricted "control" to
the actual direction of corporate affairs. Some courts have extended
"control" even further to include "the ability to exert influence,
215. See Summerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with The Euro-Soviet
Block and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAW. 861, 866 (1964); U.S. Treas. Dep't Pub. Circular
No. 30, 7 Fed. Reg. 2503 (Apr. 1, 1942).
216. 15 C.F.R. 5 369.1(b)(v) (1988).
217. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (expired 1979).
218. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (Supp.
1989).
219. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(1) (1988).
220. Id. § 369.1(e)(2)(i).
221. Id. § 369.1(e)(2)(ii).
222. Id. 5 369.1(c)(2)(iii).
223. Id. § 369.1(c)(2)(iv).
224. Id. § 369.1(c)(2)(v).
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directly or indirectly, over the decision-making process of another
person." ' 22 The regulations under the export control acts defining
foreign concerns "controlled in fact" thus refer to "the authority
or ability to establish the general policies or to control . ... ,26
When one turns from "control" for general purposes to the
particular problems presented in case of specialized activities singled
out for rules of their own, specialized definitions may be employed
to implement the particular statutory provision in issue. Thus, for
purposes of determining whether an allegedly controlling party is an
"issuer" under the Securities Act of 1933, "control" has been defined




In its Principles of Corporate Governance, the American Law Institute
has defined "control" as the "power, directly or indirectly ... to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of
a business organization .... "228 It further provides that a person
"who owns or has the power to vote more than 25 percent of the
equity interest . . . is presumed to be in control . . . unless some
other person... owns or has the power to vote a greater percentage
... ,,229 The standard includes a power arising from an "arrange-
ment or understanding with others." The Comment makes it plain
that the presumption is rebuttable. These provisions are substantially
the same as those contained in the proposed Federal Securities Code
of the InstituteP° modelled after comparable provisions in the Public
Utility Holding Company Act,231 the Investment Companies Act, 2
225. See Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (citing
American Gen. Inc. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 751 (E.D.
Va. 1980)).
The question remains whether such influence must be a "controlling influence."
The Public Utility Holding Company Act, thus, refers to a "controlling influence
over ... management or policies." 15 U.S.C. 55 79b(a)(7)(B) (1982). &e also
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 1.05(a) (Tent. Draft. No. 5,
1986); A.L.I., FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE 5 230 (1980).
226. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(1) (1988).
227. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 402 (2d ed. 1988).
228. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.05(a) (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1986).
229. Id. § 1.05b.
230. A.L.I., FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 230 (1980).
231. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79b(a)(7), (8), (11) (1982).
232. Id. §§ 80a-2(a)(3), (9).
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and the Investment Advisers Act. 233 While this does not represent a
generally accepted standard of "control" in areas other than the
securities acts, the definition, if not the presumption, will unques-
tionably influence the development of the law in this area.
B. "Control" as the Sole Standard or as Part of a More Complex
Standard
This experience in American statutory law leaves no doubt that
utilization of the concept of "control" as the legal standard for the
attribution of legal rights and duties of a controlled subsidiary cor-
poration to its parent corporation, or to affiliated corporations under
common control as well, is an entirely feasible test. It is a test that
would bring legal and economic frames of reference into happy
congruence to the extent that the companies under common control
collectively conduct a common enterprise.
But what if a conglomerate of unrelated businesses is involved?
The affiliated corporations are as much linked by "control" as in
other groups. However, their economic interrelationship is very dif-
ferent insofar as the markets and industries served are concerned.
In such aspects of group operations as the extent of administrative
and financial interdependence of the affiliated companies within the
group or the question of whether the business operations conducted
by the group function under a common public persona, or under
different public personae, conglomerate groups differ among them-
selves, and generalization is impossible.
In light of this economic diversity, is "control" in and of itself
sufficient to identify those circumstances under which the rights and
duties of one corporation of a corporate group should be attributed
to its parent corporation or other affiliated constituent companies of
the group? If "control" is not sufficient, what additional unifying
factors, reflecting the nature of the interrelationship of the affiliated
corporations in the conduct of their economic activities and in the
corporate managerial structure might be required as well?
In this connection, it should be recognized that in the case of
particular statutes, "control" may appear to serve as the single
standard in the statute or regulations. However, as noted above,
such a definition is designed to implement regulation of a particular
industry or economic activity and, within that sector, deals only with
233. Id. § 80b-2(a)(12).
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carefully specified activities, such as rates, services, issuance of se-
curities, transfers of control, merger, or entry. Accordingly, not-
withstanding its central role in the statutes, "control" is somewhat
less than a universal unifying factor in practice.
The case for requiring unifying factors in addition to "control"
rests essentially on an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages
of limited liability within the group .2 4 Utilization of a "control" test
as the sole basis for imposition of liability on affiliated companies
of the corporate group would mean the automatic elimination of
limited liability for the constituent companies of the group in every
case. The group constituent companies would be telescoped into a
single juridical entity, and group liability would arise in place of the
multiple layers of corporate limited liability within the group existing
under current law. The corporate group would then be equivalent
to the simple corporation that was the norm when legal liability was
first accepted. The concept of limited liability would again protect
only the public investors in the enterprise from the obligations of
the enterprise. To this extent, lav and economic realities would again
be in harmony.
However, limited liability encourages investment by limiting
risk. This principle applies to corporate groups as well. An inability
to segregate corporate risks and to achieve limited liability with respect
to particular activities would inevitably on the margin deter some
groups from undertaking capital investment perceived to involve high
risks. Such a damper on risk taking and on entrepreneurial activity
has to be recognized as a cost of the imposition of group liability.
If accepted, one would have to do so on the basis of a recognition
that even greater gains would be achieved by a new doctrine.
The costs involved and offsetting advantages of such a step vary
with various areas of the law. Contract liability, for example, provides
the best example of adverse consequences arising from a standard
resting solely on "control." Where there is no disparity in bargaining
power, it is economically advantageous for freely bargaining inde-
pendent parties to have the freedom to bargain over the credit
elements of the transaction, including a specification of the company
or companies to be liable. Although such an opportunity could be
preserved by express waiver of liability, such a rule introduces the
burden of requiring the parties to contract around the law. In the
234. As previously noted, the protection of limited liability for investors in the
parent corporation would continue without change.
1990]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
case of public issues of corporate debt, a regime of piece-meal group
liability waivers may contribute to some public confusion, although
the sophisticated securities markets should have the capacity to iden-
tify readily the obligors on a subsidiary's debt issue. Another un-
desirable consequence would be the windfall for third parties dealing
with a group constituent without recognizing that it was a group
member. In enterprises not utilizing a group persona, trademark,
logo, or otherwise presenting a common identity to the public, the
imposition of group liability under all circumstances seems excessive.
This, however, is only one aspect of contract liability. In the
many instances where the superior bargaining power of the large
corporate group enables it to designate the terms on which it will
deal with weaker parties, the group would automatically include in
its standard forms a clause expressly limiting liability to the particular
constituent company involved in the transaction. In such cases,
limited liability would continue de facto notwithstanding the use of
"control" as a unifying factor determining group liability in other
areas. The alleged disadvantages of "control" in discouraging risk-
taking and entrepreneurial activity may, accordingly, not be as sig-
nificant as might first appear in contract matters.
Tort law presents a different problem. While use of "control"
would, indeed, mean the loss of multiple layers of limited liability
within the group and make the group as a whole liable for torts of
each constituent company, there is widespread agreement that just
such an elimination of limited liability would be an advantageous
development. The group would then be responsible for all costs of
the enterprise being conducted by it and the group would lose its
present capacity to externalize some of its costs by limiting its liability
for torts of constituent companies. Such a change would dispose of
one of the principal criticisms of the economists with respect to
limited liability.23 5 Further, the availability of insurance for such
increased tort exposure provides a ready means for the group to
restrict its exposure.
In the case of conglomerate groups, this advantage must be
weighed against an adverse consequence. Where the group conducted
a number of unrelated businesses, the elimination of limited liability
within the conglomerate group would result in the automatic im-
position of costs arising from one economic activity upon unrelated
activities in other areas; costs would inevitably be externalized. This
235. See Blumberg, Limited Liability, supra note 1, at 616-19.
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would be contrary to the premise underlying modern concepts of
enterprise liability that costs should not be externalized and that
consumers purchasing a product should be paying ultimately for all
the costs of producing the product. 2 6
Within the group, such limited externalization would arise only
where the assets of the constituent company in question were in-
sufficient to satisfy its uninsured tort liabilities. Although likely to
be isolated, such instances would inevitably arise, particularly in
cases attracting public attention. The question whether such marginal
occurrences would significantly reduce entrepreneurial activity overall
is problematic. The impact would not only be limited to conglom-
erates but to conglomerates with the isolated problem described
above.
In those areas of the law where limited liability does not play
any role, the foregoing concerns with adverse consequences of reliance
on "control" as the sole unifying factor for attributing legal con-
sequences to a parent corporation or to affiliated companies within
the group by reason of the activities of a subsidiary do not arise.
Thus, in the law of procedure where the functioning of the
process of the legal system rather than the imposition of liability is
involved, utilization of "control" alone as the standard and the
consequent elimination of limited liability presents few difficulties.
Indeed, in some procedural areas of which discovery, res judicata,
collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, and injunctions are ready
examples, the development of the law of corporate groups in
unheralded fashion has already moved on to use of the doc-
trine of "control" to determine the attribution to the parent (or
controlling shareholders) of certain legal consequences from activities
or determinations involving a subsidiary (or controlled corpora-
tions),.27 Without limited liability in the way, the movement of the
law from entity law to enterprise law for this limited purpose has been
a relatively easy process for judicial evolution, even in a period in
which entity law has been almost universally accepted for other
purposes. Similarly, in the area of bankruptcy, the doctrine of void-
able preferences and, to a lesser extent, the doctrine of fraudulent
236. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 153 (1976); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 461 (1985).
237. See BLUMBEr: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at chs. 10-12, 15.
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transfers have been held applicable to constituent companies of cor-
porate groups in reliance on "control.' '238
Even in the areas of the law where substantive liability is con-
cerned, reliance on "control" as the sole unifying standard for group
liability with the consequent elimination of limited liability within
the group appears to present few undesirable consequences, except
to some degree in the case of conglomerate groups conducting a
series of enterprises serving widely separate markets.
Recognition of the existence of this aspect of the problem-
although limited-may lead to the inquiry into whether the appro-
priate unifying standard for determining group liability should em-
brace other elements in addition to "control." In such event, the
extensive American judicial experience considering the alternatives
of entity law or enterprise law in constitutional law, statutory law
or from the common law vantage point of "piercing the veil juris-
prudence" have suggested a host of factors to be considered along
with "control" for purposes of determining group liability for the
purpose at hand. These include: economic integration of the business
or businesses of the constituent companies; administrative interde-
pendence of the constituent companies; financial interdependence of
the constituent companies; and the use of a common public persona
for the constituent companies of the group. They provide a com-
prehensive set of criteria for defining an "economic entity" that can
serve as the basis for imposition of group liability to supplement or
replace the legal entity of traditional corporation law.
At the outset, it should be recognized that these factors are
obviously independent variables, and that the permutations of dis-
tribution among groups are almost endless. Thus, any concept of
the "economic entity" would have considerable variations and diffuse
contours in contrast to the well defined standard of entity law or
"control" as the sole determining factor.
Reliance on the foregoing unifying factors in varying degrees
is evident in a number of areas in American law employing alternative
approaches in the formulation of doctrines of "economic entity" or
"enterprise" to supplement or replace traditional entity law. These
are the "unitary business" principle in American constitutional law,
the "integrated enterprise" or "single employer" doctrines in Amer-
ican labor and employment discrimination law, and the enterprise
law cases emerging from "piercing the veil jurisprudence." Although
238. See BLUMBERG: BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, at chs. 7-9.
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differently expressed, economic integration of the activities of the related
companies is a cardinal feature of each and unmistakably must be recognized,
along with "control" as a paramount factor in these newer doctrines.
C. "Unitay Business"
The "unitary business" doctrine in United States constitutional
law provides just such an example combining "control" with eco-
nomic integration and managerial structure to provide a workable
enterprise law standard for determining the constitutional limitations
on the imposition of liability on constituent companies of corporate
groups in the area of state taxation.
From 1980 to 1983, five decisions of the Supreme Court, starting
with Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont,2'9 involved
the constitutionality under the commerce clause, equal protection
clause, and foreign commerce clause of state taxation of local affiliates
or operations of American multinational corporations. 20 In these
cases, the Supreme Court developed the theory of the "unitary
business" as the standard for determining the constitutionality of
the taxation by states of local affiliates or operations of multinational
enterprises by apportionment formulae taking into account the world-
wide activities of the group of which the local affiliates or operations
were a constituent part. Typically, the formula imposed a tax on
the local company based on the proportion that its local sales, assets,
and net income bore to the worldwide sales, assets, and net income
of the group. Through use of the formula, the states derived sig-
nificantly higher taxes than if the local unit had been taxed solely
on its own activities. 241
239. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). The other decisions are Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, rehg denied, 464: U.S. 909 (1983); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 454 (1982); ASARCO,
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); and Exon Corp. v.
Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
240. The five decisions involved American-based multinational corporations.
States have also employed worldwide unitary tax apportionment in the taxation of
subsidiaries of foreign-based multinational corporations. The courts of appeal have
not agreed whether in such cases the foreign parent corporation has standing to
contest the constitutionality of such an action. Compare Alcan Aluminium, Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1989) (standing upheld), rev'd on other
grounds, 58 U.S.L.W. 4121 (U.S. .Jan. 10, 1990) (in present posture action barred
by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1989)), with Shell Petroleum,
N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir.) (standing denied), cat. denied, 464
U.S. 1012 (1983).
241. See Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 197-201 (Powell, J., dissenting),
reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
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Each of these Supreme Court decisions involved a nondomiciliary
parent corporation authorized to conduct business within the taxing
state. However, the Supreme Courts of Alaska and Colorado have
used the "unitary business" standard to uphold the application of
unitary apportionment to in-state subsidiary corporations.142
In applying the due process clause to the imposition of state
taxes under a unitary apportionment formula on in-state group af-
filiates through the apportionment of multi-state or multinational
operations of the group as a whole, the Court has vigorously rejected
various constitutional challenges in the face of the "underlying ec-
onomic realities" of a unitary business. As long as the in-state affiliate
and the out-of-state affiliates included in the apportionment formula
base are commonly engaged in the conduct of an integrated unitary
business and do not represent "discrete" business enterprises, the
Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the tax, not only
under the due process clause, but under the commerce clause and
the foreign commerce clause as well.
As stated in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 243
"[T]he linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income tax-
ation is the unitary-business principle, 244 the crucial factor on which
constitutionality turns. The Court has focused both on the underlying
"unity or diversity of [the] business enterprise, ' 245 and on the fact
that, as an economic matter, "a functionally integrated enterprise ' 246
was involved. It has refused to distinguish between the form of
investment or business organization, such as the organization of
subsidiaries and affiliates rather than unincorporated divisions. "The
underlying economic realities of a unitary business" are decisive.147
In this analysis, the Court has stressed such factors as economies of
scale and centralized management as well as functional integration.
The formal segregation of functional departments as independent
profit centers has been ignored where the departments are parts of
a "highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of
centralized management and controlled interaction."2 4 8 The necessary
242. Earth Resources Co. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 665 P.2d 960 (Alaska
1983); Lone Star Steel Co. v. Dolan, 668 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
243. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
244. Id. at 439.
245. Id. at 440.
246. Id. at 441.
247. Id.
248. Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 224.
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relationship is demonstrated by such features as the availability of
"essential corporate services for the entire company, including the
coordination of ...operational functions ' 219 or the use of "cen-
tralized purchasing" or a centralized marketing system involving "a
uniform credit card system, uniform packaging, brand names, and
promotional displays .... 250
In contrast, functional integration of the subsidiaries within the
group and centralization of management were held not to exist2 1
where foreign merchandising subsidiaries autonomously and inde-
pendently performed such major functions as selection of merchan-
dise, store site selection, advertising, and accounting without any
"centralized purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing" or "cen-
tral personnel training," where financing was independent of the
parent, and where there was no exchange of personnel.
The dividing line is whether the affiliated companies in question
are "an integral part" of a unitary business252 or whether they are
"discrete business enterprises." Are the activities interrelated in
" 'any business or economic sense' ,,?233 The critical issue is whether
the business conducted by the group component within the taxing
state is dependent on or contributes to the out-of-state operations of
the group and whether a sharing or exchange of values is present.2
The Court had previously made it plain that as long as an integrated
business was involved, it was irrelevant whether it was integrated
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 454 (1982).
252. A Maryland court has held that the critical issue is not whether there is
a unitary relationship between the in-state parent corporation receiving an interest
payment and the out-of-state debtor company making the payment. The question
is whether the portion of the parent's business responsible for the loan was a unitary
part of the parent's in-state business. See Comptroller v. Armco, Inc., 70 Md. App.
403, 420, 521 A.2d 785, 793 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
253. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 328 (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439-42).
254. See Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d
496, 501-02, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805, 807, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961, appeal dimissedfor
want of jrisdiction, 400 U.S. 961 (1970).
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vertically 25 or horizontally. 256
This economic test supersedes the technical legal form of or-
ganization in determining the constitutionality of the application of
the tax to the group in question. Indeed, a reluctance to have the
incidence of taxation controlled by a taxpayer's selection of the formal
structure for the conduct of its business is a major factor supporting
utilization of unitary apportionment in preference to other tax meth-
ods.
Although there have been suggestions that multinational cor-
porations present different issues from multi-state enterprises in which
foreign nations are not involved,2 57 the Court has refused to make
any such distinction and has repeatedly upheld the application of a
tax based on worldwide unitary apportionment to foreign operations
of United States-based multinational groups2 8 or to foreign operations
of the taxpayer itself.259 An issue still not definitively resolved is
whether such a tax may be constitutionally imposed on the domestic
components of foreign-based multinationals. 60
1. Mobil Oil
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont 26 involved a
New York corporation ("Mobil") which had its commercial domicile
in New York but which conducted a worldwide integrated petroleum
business with hundreds of subsidiaries. It did business directly in
many states, including Vermont; however, its Vermont activities
were "but a small part of the corporation's worldwide enterprise."
Vermont imposed an income tax on the portion of a taxpayer's
federal net taxable income attributable to Vermont under a three-
255. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 166. See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton,
Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805, cert. denied, 400 US. 961, appeal
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 400 U.S. 961 (1970).
256. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 166. See also Butler Bros. v. McColgan,
315 U.S. 501 (1942); Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1970) cert denied, 400 U.S. 961, appeal dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, 400 U.S. 961 (1970); Commissioner of Revenue v. Associated
Dry Goods, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1984).
257. See Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26, 195 n.32.
258. Id. at 195; Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 448.
259. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 194-95.
260. See id. at 195 n.32.
261. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
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factor apportionment formula. Mobil contended that the taxation of
dividend receipts from its subsidiaries and affiliates operating abroad
violated the due process clause, the commerce clause, and the foreign
commerce clause. It asserted that the very character of dividends
from a foreign source precluded state taxation.
The Court, rejecting that contention, enunciated the following
constitutional standard:
For a State to tax income generated in interstate commerce,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes two requirements: a "minimal connection" be-
tween the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a
rational relationship between the income attributed to the
State and the intrastate values of the enterprise. The req-
uisite "nexus" is supplied if the corporation avails itself of
the "substantial privilege of carrying on business" within
the State .... 262
The source of the income does not preclude taxability as long as the
business is unitary and the tax is appropriately apportioned.
Invoking entity law, Mobil attempted to identify its holding
company function as a separate business. The Court did not find
the argument "particularly persuasive," stating:
So long as dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates reflect
profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise,
those dividends are income to the parent earned in a unitary
business. One must look principally at the underlying ac-
tivity, not at the form of investment, to determine the
propriety of apportionability.
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more
attractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form of business
organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or
diversity of business enterprise. ... Transforming the same income
[directly earned by a parent through divisions] into dividends from
legally separate entities works no change in the underlying economic
realities of a unitary business, and accordingly it ought not to affect
the apportionability of income the parent receives. 2 63
The Court also rejected Mobil's commerce clause challenges.
262. Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
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2. Exxon Corporation
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wisconsin264 involved a
vertically integrated multinational corporation organized under the
laws of Delaware with general offices in Texas. Wisconsin, where
Exxon conducted marketing operations, sought to tax Exxon based
on a unitary three-factor apportionment formula utilizing worldwide
Exxon sales, assets, and payroll. Exxon contended that such action
violated the due process clause because it only conducted marketing
operations in Wisconsin, while its functional accounting structure
separated its income into three distinct categories-marketing, ex-
ploration, and production.
The Court applied the due process clause standards enunciated
in Mobil Oil. It found that Exxon comprised a unitary business
and upheld the constitutionality of the Wisconsin tax. The nexus
between the interstate activities and the taxing state could not be
defeated by the company's internal accounting procedures. Rec-
ognizing that the "unitary-business principle" was the "linchpin
of apportionability," the Court found that the Wisconsin mar-
keting operation was an integral part of a "highly integrated
business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized manage-
ment and controlled interaction.' '265 Accordingly, there was "'a ra-
tional relationship between the income attributed to the State and
the intrastate values of the enterprise.' "266 It was irrelevant that
Exxon was functionally organized, with its operational departments
treated as independent profit centers. 267
3. ASARCO
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission268 involved the con-
stitutional power of Idaho to tax a nondomiciliary multinational
parent corporation authorized to do business within Idaho on such
intangible income as dividends, interest payments, and capital gains
that the parent received from Latin America and European subsidiary
corporations that had no connection with the State. The Court held
264. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
265. Id. at 224.
266. Id. at 219-20 (quoting Mobil Oil, 440 U.S. at 436-37).
267. Id. at 224-25.
268. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
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that the parent did not exercise its power to control three of the five
subsidiaries in which it had a majority interest and that it lacked a
majority interest in the other two. The subsidiaries did not seek
approval from the parent with respect to their decisions. Emphasizing
the need for the actual exercise of control in this context, not merely
potential control, the Court held, in language borrowed from Mobil
Oil, that the businesses of the subsidiaries were autonomous and
"'discrete business enterprise[s]' that-in 'any business or economic
sense'-have 'nothing to do with the activities' of ASARCO in
Idaho. "269 It rejected the alternative standard advanced by Idaho
that it was sufficient if the intangibles contributed or in some way
related to or furthered the taxpayer's business. 2 0 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Idaho tax was unconstitutional.
4. F. W. Woolworth Company
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department of New
Mexico27' involved New Mexico's application of worldwide unitary
tax apportionment to a nondomiciliary multinational corporation,
with its principal place of business and commercial domicile in New
York, conducting a national chain of retail stores in the United
States, including a New Mexico store, as well as abroad. New Mexico
taxed dividends received by the nondomiciliary parent from four
English subsidiaries that had no connection with the State. The
Court held that taxation of such foreign dividends violated the due
process clause where the subsidiaries were not "functionally inte-
grated" into the parent's business and therefore were not part of
the "unitary business," the income of which could be constitutionally
taxed by appropriate apportionment. 27 2
The Court reviewed the operations of the subsidiaries in the
light of the standards established in Mobil Oil to ascertain whether
"contributions to income [of the subsidiaries] result[ed] from func-
tional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale. 27 3 It found "that no phase of any subsidiary's business was
integrated with the parent's.' '274 Each subsidiary autonomously and
269. Id. at 328 (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439-42).
270. Id. at 326-27.
271. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
272. Id. at 372.
273. Id. at 364 (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438).
274. Id. at 365.
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independently decided such questions as merchandise selection, store
site selection, advertising, and accounting controls. Each had its own
accounting, financial staff, and outside counsel. There was no cen-
tralized purchasing, merchandising, warehousing, or personnel train-
ing programs. Each subsidiary did its own financing. Management
was autonomous, and there was no rotation of personnel. No con-
solidated returns were filed. 275 On the other hand, there were man-
agerial links on a senior level, and the parent approved major financial
decisions, the amount of dividends, and major borrowing. Consol-
idated financial statements were published, and all companies used
the Woolworth name.
On these facts, the Court held that the subsidiaries were not
part of a unitary business but were "discrete business enter-
prise[s].' ' 27 6
F. W. Woolworth carried the ASARCO decision277 one step further.
Unlike the parent company in ASARCO, the parent in F. W. Woolworth
had the potential power to operate the foreign subsidiaries "as in-
tegrated divisions of a single unitary business. ' 27 8 The Court found
that it had not done so and that accordingly, notwithstanding the
incidental economic benefit from the subsidiaries, the dividends were
not subject to apportionment under the due process clause. 279
5. Container Corporation
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,28 the Court
reaffirmed its earlier decisions in F. W. Woolworth, ASARCO, Exxon,
and Mobil Oil. It upheld the constitutionality of California's appli-
cation of worldwide unitary tax apportionment to a nondomiciliary
275. Id. at 365-66.
276. Id. at 372 (citation omitted) (quoting Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Missouri
State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 n.5 (1968) (quoting Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949)).




280. 463 U.S. 159, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983). See Hartman, Constitutional
Limitations on State Taxation of Corporate Income from Multinational Corporations, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 217, 247-70 (1984); Stuart & Williams, Constitutional Considerations of State
Taxation of Multinational Corporate Income: Before and After Container Corporation of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 16 IND. L. REV. 783 (1983); Weissman, Unitary




American parent corporation authorized to conduct business within
the State involving subsidiaries based abroad without property, pay-
roll, receipts, or other connection with the State. The parent was
incorporated in Delaware and had its headquarters in Illinois; it
controlled twenty foreign subsidiaries operating in Europe and Latin
America.
The Court first drew a distinction between a limited investment
relationship and the economic integration of the components of a
corporate group, stating:
Investment in a business enterprise truly "distinct" from
a corporation's main line of business often serves the pri-
mary function of diversifying the corporate portfolio and
reducing the risks inherent in being tied to one industry's
business cycle. When a corporation invests in a subsidiary
that engages in the same line of work as itself, it becomes
much more likely that one function of the investment is to
make better use-either through economies of scale or
through operational integration or sharing of expertise-of
the parent's existing business-related resources2 11
The Court then reaffirmed the standards enunciated in Mobil Oil
and F. W. Woolworth, requiring proof of " '[s]ubstantial mutual
interdependence' ,,28 of the components and contributions to income
resulting from " 'functional integration, centralization of manage-
ment and economies of scale,' ",20 and a "functionally integrated
enterprise.' '284
The California Court of Appeals had concluded that the parent
and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a unitary business. As re-
viewed by Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, the California
court relied on
appellant's assistance to its subsidiaries in obtaining used
and new equipment and in filling personnel needs that could
not be met locally, the substantial role played by appellant
in loaning funds to the subsidiaries and guaranteeing loans
281. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 178.
282. Id. at 179 (quoting F. T. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 371).
283. Id. (quoting F. W. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 364 (quoting Mobil Oil, 445
U.S. at 438)).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 159.
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provided by others, the "considerable interplay between
appellant and its foreign subsidiaries in the area of corporate
expansion," the "substantial" technical assistance provided
by appellant to the subsidiaries, and the supervisory role
played by appellant's officers in providing general guidance
to the subsidiaries. 286
In light of the foregoing factors, the Court found the decision of the
state court upholding the tax constitutionally acceptable.
Although illustrations of enterprise law, these decisions relate
only to a collateral aspect of the problem. The "unitary business"
standard supports the constitutionality of state taxation imposed on
the local affiliate, not on the group or its foreign affiliated companies,
and only measured by worldwide apportionment of the total sales,
assets, and net income of the group. Thus, it must be recognized
that the "unitary business" principle supplements but does not
displace the local affiliate (or the corporation conducting the local
branch) as the separate juridical unit on which tax liability is being
imposed.
There is a further problem to utilization of the "unitary busi-
ness" principle as a standard for determining the scope of liability
or other vicarious attribution of legal consequences among group
members not directly involved in the activities under consideration.
If the extent of economic and functional integration of the group
were to play a critical role in determining application of the standard
to the group, there would be a substantial risk of manipulation.
Lawyers would be influenced to counsel diversification, conglomerate
development, or managerial decentralization to avoid the imposition
of group liability. There would be incentives for groups to structure
themselves after the pattern in F. W. Woolworth rather than those in
Mobil Oil, Exxon, and Container Corp.
Thus, adoption of a "unitary business" standard for general
legal purposes might lead in some cases to the adoption of economic
and management policies resting on legal efforts to sidestep group
liability rather than on economical considerations. This would in-
evitably mean inefficiencies in terms of business operation and frus-
tration of the objective of developing an effective world legal order
to deal with multinational enterprises. These adverse consequences
apparently did not arise in the case of unitary tax apportionment,
286. Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
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perhaps because of the relatively limited extent of the tax burden
involved. Worldwide liability exposure would undoubtedly provide
a greater incentive for uneconomic corporate restructuring.
6. Summary
The "unitary business" standard turning on "functional inte-
gration" imposes relatively tight boundaries to define the type of
multinational enterprises that are included, and is limited to particular
models of managerial direction and of economic integration. Further,
it ignores other factors that have been recognized as significant in
enterprise cases occurring elsewhere in American law, particularly
administrative interdependence, financial interdependence, and group
use of a common public group persona. As a result, as illustrated
by the decision in F. W. Woolworth & Co., the "unitary business"
standard excludes major multinational enterprises that any system
of comprehensive enterprise law would seemingly have to include.
In addition to "unitary business," American law provides three
other standards for the development of a new enterprise law to govern
corporate groups. One is the "integrated enterprise" or "single
employer" doctrine developed in American labor law for purposes
of applying aspects of the labor relations and employment discrim-
ination statutes. Another is the "enterprise" concept utilized in the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 287 The third is the fragmentary body of
American enterprise law emerging as offshoots of "piercing the veil
jurisprudence," that I have called The Law of Corporate Groups.
D. "Integrated Enterprise"
The National Labor Relations Board has developed2 and the
Supreme Court has upheld2 9 the four factor "integrated enterprise"
standard29" for treating separate but closely related and "sufficiently
integrated"' ' concerns as a "single employer" for determination of
certain vital issues arising under the National Labor Relations Act.29
287. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act also uses an
"enterprise" standard but not in a context useful'for this purpose. See infra note
314.
288. See 6 Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 46:8, 46:22 (1978).
289. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union v. Broadcast
Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam).
290. See 6 Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 45:7, 45:93-:94 (1982).
291. See Broadcast Serw. of Mobile, 380 U.S. at 256.
292. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1982).
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The "integrated enterprise" standard for determining "single em-
ployer" status serves as the standard for determination of subject-
matter jurisdiction. It is also employed in the determination of the
appropriate bargaining unit, in the determination of unfair labor
practices including the duty to bargain, and in the determination of
unfair labor practices involving secondary activity for purposes of
the Labor Act.
Developed for the special needs of the labor laws, the "integrated
enterprise" standard employs four factors:
(a) interrelation of operations;
(b) centralized control of labor relations;
(c) common management;
(d) common ownership or financial control. 93
The decisions make it plain that no one of these factors is essential 94
and that, of the four factors, integrated operations and centralized
control of labor relations are the most important. 295 Common own-
ership and control, which are present in every case involving parent
and subsidiary or affiliated corporations, are clearly not decisive.2 96
There is no mechanical formula, and determinations require a case-
by-case factual evaluation. 297 In addition to the four-factor standard,
the Board has also relied on the group's common public persona'9
when deemed a representation that the group constituted a single
"integrated enterprise. '299
293. This standard, expressed by the Board in its 1956 Annual Report, was
subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in Broadcast Serv. of Mobile.
294. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271, 1276
(9th Cir. 1984).
295. This factor is satisfied where major labor policy decisions are made by
a central authority, even though day-to-day control of labor relations at a worker
level has been decentralized. See NLRB v. Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879, 883-
84 (9th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr., Inc., 596 F.2d 378, 385 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979); Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 761 (1965).
296. See 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15 (1956).
297. General Teamsters Local 959 v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 734, 738 (9th Cir.
1984); Retail Stores Employees Union, Local 1001 v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 1133, 1138
(D.C. Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Steel, Metals, Alloys & Hardware Fabricators, 460
F..2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
298. For review of other areas of the law in which use of a common public
persona has received attention in legal problems of components of corporate groups,
see BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, 5 22.05 nn.35-40; BLUMBERO: SUBSTANTIVE
COMMON LAW, supra note 38, §§ 10.04, 11.08, 13.02, 14.01, 14.02, 19.08, 20.09.
299. NLRB v. Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1971); International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 428, 169 N.L.R.B. 184 (1968); 6 Fed. Reg.
Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) 5§ 45:7 n.14, 46.23 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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This approach is functional, not conceptual. It looks to a series
of factors throwing light on the degree of interrelationship of the
affiliated corporations. Are the businesses of the affiliates economically
integrated so as to represent aspects of the same economic enterprise?
Are their operations under common control? Do the same individuals
act as directors, officers or managers of both affiliates, and, in
particular, do they act in the labor relations area of both affiliates?
Is control exercised to such an extent as to involve common or
intertwined decision-making about business matters, in general, and
labor matters, in particular? Do the affiliates present themselves to
the market as a single group utilizing the same group persona,
trademark, logo, color scheme, and the like? Are the affairs of the
two companies characterized by an absence of the arm's-length re-
lationship found among nonintegrated companies?
It is noteworthy and surprising that despite this functional stan-
dard of enterprise law developed by the Board and accepted by the
courts in cases reaching them from the Board, the very same appellate
courts in labor relations cases arising directly in the district courts -
continue to employ the traditional conceptual standards of entity law
and "piercing the veil jurisprudence" for purposes of determining
intragroup liability. 30 1
As noted above, the "integrated enterprise" standard has also
been employed for purposes of intragroup application of the American
employment discrimination statutes°2Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964303 and The Age Discrimination in Employment Act.H
The Title VII and ADEA cases widely apply the four factors
embraced in the "integrated enterprise" in the same manner as in
the labor statute from which the standard was borrowed. Of all the
factors, centralized control of labor relations and employment matters
has been recognized as the most important factor because it involves
300. Under the bifurcated system of review under the labor laws, certain
matters fall within the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
whose decisions are directly reviewed by the circuit courts of appeal. The "integrated
enterprise" doctrine is applied to this area. Other cases may be brought directly
in the district courts subject to appeal to the circuit courts of appeal. The Board
plays no role in such cases, and the "integrated enterprise" doctrine is ignored.
See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 10, § 13.02.
301. See generally BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAWv, supra note 10, at ch.
13.
302. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10, § 14.01-.06.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982).
304. 29 U.S.C. 5 621 et seq. (1982).
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the very relationship giving rise to the complaint that the statute
has been violated. However, even its absence has not been fatal in
the presence of the other factors. The focus is on the intertwining
of the businesses of the affiliated companies and on the extent of
control and participation by the parent (or other affiliate) in the
decision-making. 0 5 The "integrated enterprise" standard has also
been applied, but less often, in cases arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.30 6
E. "Enterprise"
"Enterprise" has served as a standard in at least two American
statutes. First, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) providing for
minimum wage and overtime standards applies to all "employers"
of employees of an "enterprise" in interstate commerce.
The Act defines "enterprise" as "the related activities performed
(either through unified operation or common control) by any person
or persons for the common business purpose, and includes all such
activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by
one or more corporate or other organizational units."310
The legislative history at the time of the later amendments in
1966 is instructive on the meaning of "enterprise" in the 1966 Act.
In discussing these provisions, the congressional committees noted:
[Tihe operations through substantial ownership or control
of a number of firms engaged in similar types of business
activities constitute . . . related activities performed through
unified operation or common control within the meaning
of the definition of enterprise. The fact that the firms are
independently incorporated or physically separate or under
the immediate direction of local management, ... is not
determinative .... 308
Thus, the fragmentation of a single business among a number
of affiliated corporations collectively conducting an enterprise does
not present the problems for imposition of intragroup liability under
305. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10, § 14.03.
306. See, e.g., Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 327-28
(E.D. Pa. 1984).
307. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982).
308. H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966); and S. REP. No.
1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3002, at 3009.
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the FLSA that arise under other statutes lacking such an "enterprise"
definition. Separate incorporation and entity law are irrelevant, but
important issues remain under the FLSA. Application of the Act
still requires proof of such matters as the interdependence of oper-
ations, the presence of centralized decision-making of significant
corporate decisions, the existence of a single source creating and
funding the separate entities, or the use of a common persona in
dealing with the public .3 09 On the other hand, the fact that the units
are formally distinct and retain control of day-to-day operations has
been regarded as no more than "the ordinary attributes of separate
incorporation and the management of physically separate units. ' 310
Control over the selection and supervision of the local managers is
sufficient.3 11 Where the necessary interrelation is not shown, a mere
parent-subsidiary relationship or the existence of common control is
insufficient to support application of the FLSA.3 12
The significance of this use of "enterprise" is limited. It is an
isolated example. Further, application of the Act requires proof of
an employer-employee relationship as well. Although the latter re-
lationship has an expansive statutory standard including persons
"acting in the interests of an employer," the Court has limited
application of the Act to parent corporations exercising substantial
control over their subsidiaries.3 13
The second statute which uses the term "enterprise" is the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. However, this
statutory definition is not useful for application to contract, tort, and
other legal problems of legitimate business organizations. '4
309. Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 966-71 (5th Cir. 1984), ceat.
denied, 421 U.S. 1174 (1985); Donovan v. Janitorial Servs., Inc., 672 F.2d 528,
530 (5th Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 482 F.2d 1362,
1366-67 (5th Cir. 1973); Shultz v. Mack Farland & Sons Roofing Co., 413 F.2d
1296, 1299-1301 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Barnes Grocery Co., 398 F.2d 718 (8th
Cir. 1968).
310. Donovan, 747 F.2d at 970.
311. Id. at 970-71; Shultz, 413 F.2d at 1300-01. See also Donoran, 672 F.2d at
531; West v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
312. Hodgson v. University Club Tower, 466 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1972) (parent
and subsidiary corporations); Wabash Radio Corp. v. Walling, 162 F.2d 391 (6th
Cir. 1947); Ferrer v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 70 F. Supp. 1, reh'g granted, 76 F.
Supp. 601 (D.P.R. 1970); Wirtz v. Hardin, 253 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 359 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1966); Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg
Co., 38 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (sister corporations).
313. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 10, 9 15.02.
314. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
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F. American Law of Corporate Groups
In many areas of "piercing the veil jurisprudence," variously
called the "alter ego" or "instrumentality" or identity doctrine,
bordering on enterprise law, such factors as economic integration,
managerial structure, administrative and financial interdependence,
and use of a common group public persona play an important role,
along with control, in determining the boundaries of intragroup rights
and duties. Although these cases cover an enormous area of the law
and do not as yet reflect a well-defined body of law, they represent
the early stages of the development of a law of corporate groups.
They provide the basis for still another unifying principle to serve
the needs of enterprise law.
Conventional "piercing the veil jurisprudence" combines "con-
trol," particularly intrusive exercise of control over the decision-
making processes of a subsidiary, with five very different elements
to establish a foundation for disregard of the corporate entity: (a)
lack of indicia of separate corporate organization such as separate
offices, telephone numbers, stationery, plants, employees, or equip-
ment; (b) lack of compliance with corporate formalities, such as
failure to hold meetings of directors and shareholders, absence of
minutes of meetings, lack of records, books of account, tax returns
or reports; (c) lack of adequate capitalization commensurate to the
risks and scale of the enterprise being undertaken; (d) group inte-
gration (economic integration, administrative interdependence, and
financial interdependence); and (e) use of a common group public
persona.
3 15
Even where such factors have been shown, most, but not all,
courts applying "piercing the veil jurisprudence" require some ad-
ditional proof before the court will disregard the separate entity to
impose liability or attribute other legal consequences to the parent
or other affiliated corporations. Such courts require proof of some
"inequitable" or "fraudulent" or "morally culpable" or "funda-
mentally unfair" acts of the parent corporation (or controlling share-
The statute combines definition of "enterprise" with an unlawful conduct consti-
tuting a "pattern of racketeering activity." For this highly specialized purpose, the
statute defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4). See BLUMBERO: GENERAL STATUTORY
LAW, supra note 10, § 29.03.2.




holder) causing injury to creditors. Financial manipulation of the
subsidiary's (or controlled corporation's) affairs, damaging to cred-
itors-such as asset-siphoning for the benefit of the parent, asset-
shuffling among controlled companies generally, and confusion cre-
ated by absence of financial records-is perhaps the most frequent
type of misconduct satisfying such courts' element of major impor-
tance. 3 16 Inadequate capitalization is another.31 7 Misrepresentation is
a third.
Such disregard of entity of a constituent company of a corporate
group and recognition of group liability through "piercing the veil"
occurs only in "rare" or "exceptional" cases. Courts exercise their
powers of equitable intervention to prevent unacceptable conduct in
particularly egregious cases.
In the past, courts widely applied the doctrine indiscriminately
without recognizing the fundamental distinctions involved by the
different areas of the law involved. "Piercing the veil" was generally
very much the same whether the case at hand involved tort, contract,
property, tax, jurisdiction, bankruptcy, or federal statutory matters.
Along with inconsistency and unpredictability, such indiscriminate
use has been one of the most criticized features of the doctrine.
There are some signs of change. This is most evident in cases
involving federal statutory law318 and in a growing recognition of the
vital differences between the underlying objectives of the law in tort
and contract cases.3 19
Courts are also beginning to become increasingly concerned with
the chaotic theoretical content of the doctrine. Thus, in Mesler v.
316. See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAWv, supra note 38, §510.07, 11.05,
19.09, 20.04.
317. Inadequacy of capitalization is a powerful factor making for liability
although traditional "piercing the veil jurisprudence" typically requires other factors
as well. See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960) (no
"piercing the veil" case can be found imposing liability solely because of inadequate
capitalization); BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMiON LAv, supra note 38, 5 19.12,
20.10.
318. See, e.g., Town of Brookline, 667 F.2d at 221; Capital Tel. Co., 498 F.2d
at 738-39; Kavanaugh, 353 F.2d at 717; Elnas Trading Co., 620 F. Supp. at 234;
Firestone Tire & Rubber & Co., 518 F. Supp. at 1039. See also cases cited infra note
323.
319. Edward Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984);
J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 n.13 (8th Cir. 1980); Geletucha
v. 222 Delaware Corp., 7 A.D.2d 315, 182 N.Y.S.2d 893 (4th Dept. 1959); Gentry
v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975).
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Bragg Management Co. ,320 the California Supreme Court has recently
forcefully asserted the principle, which should have been obvious but
has been widely ignored, that a disregard of the corporate entity
under the doctrine was only for the particular purposes of the case
at hand, and not for all purposes.
In Castleberry v. Branscum,321 the Supreme Court of Texas com-
mendably attempted to break down "piercing the veil jurisprudence"
into a number of different related doctrines turning on the nature
of the "inequitable" conduct involved. The Texas court first pointed
to cases where the separateness of the corporate identity of the
subsidiary (or controlled) corporation had ceased and where restrict-
ing liability to the controlled entity would result in injustice; it stated
that the "alter ego" label should be restricted to such cases. In
addition, it noted numerous other circumstances for "piercing the
veil" even though "corporate formalities have been observed and
corporate and individual property have been kept separately, when
the corporate form has been part of a basically unfair device to
achieve an inequitable result." It then specified seven different classes
of cases:
(1) when the fiction is used as a means of perpetuating fraud;
(2) where a corporation is organized and operated as a mere
tool or business conduit for another corporation;
(3) where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of
evading an existing legal obligation;
(4) where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve or per-
petuate monopoly;
(5) where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a statute;
and
(6) where the corporate fiction is relied on as protectiom of
crime or to justify wrong.
Inadequate capitalization was advanced as the seventh type. 22
It should be evident that the analysis, while helpful, does not
go very far. The court has particularized certain types of wrongful
conduct without dealing with the fundamental issue of shaping the
doctrine to serve the underlying objectives of the law in the particular
320. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal.3d 290, 702 P.2d 601 (1985).
See Comment, Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., A Dramatic Change in the Application
of the Alter Ego Doctrine, 18 PAC. L.J. 293 (1986).
321. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1987).
322. Id. at 272 n.3 (footnotes omitted).
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area involved in the case at hand. Nor does it grapple with the
problems presented by multi-tiered corporate enterprises.
Thus, to establish a more satisfactory level of social control over
multinational groups and their constituent companies, enterprise law
would have to reach the normal, not the exceptional, aspects of
multinational conduct. It would have to rest on the economic reality
of the integrated operations of the constituents of the controlled group
without regard to the existence of particular occasions of "inequi-
table" or other "morally culpable" conduct. There are some signs
that the law is moving in this direction.
In the area of American statutory law in particular, the "piercing
the veil" decisions are increasingly recognizing that the stringent
requirements of the traditional doctrine must be significantly relaxed
in order to implement statutory objectives and prevent evasion or
frustration of the statutory program.23z
In identifying the possible content of enterprise law, "control"
obviously plays a central role. What additional factors are necessary
to provide an adequate unifying standard for the attribution of liability
and other legal consequences to affiliated companies of the group?
The first two elements of "piercing the veil jurisprudence"-
lack of indicia of separate existence and lack of compliance with
corporate formalities-reflect absence of legal advice and are over-
whelmingly found in small businesses. They rarely arise in cases
involving corporate groups and should occupy no significant role in
the formulation of enterprise law for corporate groups. While financial
misconduct does occur on occasion in corporate groups as in other
businesses, it represents a departure from the norm of acceptable
financial conduct and similarly is not useful in formulating enterprise
law for application to corporate groups generally. The foregoing
factors may, of course, provide their own basis for imposition of
intragroup liability but should not be a necessary part of any general
principle.
Thus, if enterprise law is to emerge from its unsystematic and
fragmentary beginnings in American law and be something other
323. See BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 10, S 2.05.3. See
also, e.g., United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085, 1092-94 (D.
Minn. 1982) (corporate entity can be disregarded if failure to do so would allow
corporate device to be used to circumvent the statutory scheme); United Paper-
workers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 620-21 (D. Me.
1977), aff'd sub nom. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583
F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978) ("Federal policies are not to be defeated by [relying] on
the impenetrability of the corporate veil.").
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than a variant of "piercing the veil jurisprudence," formulation of
an enterprise standard for corporate groups would have to build on
the elements of "control" supplemented by such factors increasingly
recognized in the cases as economic integration, administrative and
financial interdependence, and utilization of a common public per-
sona. These are the very factors that overwhelmingly characterize
the modern transnational corporation and thereby provide a sound
basis for enterprise law of general application. Such a standard would
obviously fall somewhere between the all-inclusive reach of the "con-
trol" standard and the too limited sphere of the "unitary business"
doctrine.
While resolution of the conflicting factors at work is not easy,
the development of a general enterprise law and prevention of law-
yers' use of corporate structure to externalize costs3 24 seem sufficiently
important to offset the adverse impact on risk taking. However,
further evolution of the statutory and case law and further ripening
of the problem and better understanding of the costs and consequences
lurking in the alternatives should ultimately permit a more informed
resolution of the problem.
This is a dynamic area of law. Unsatisfying as it is not to have
a clear blueprint for the future development of enterprise principles
to deal with the profound problems presented by corporate groups,
the present level of understanding is still inadequate. In terms familiar
to the judiciary, the issue is not "ripe" for final doctrinal definition.
However as previously emphasized, the factors of control, economic
integration, administrative and financial interdependence, and util-
ization of a common public person considered against the background
of the underlying policies and objectives of the law in the area in
question undoubtedly play a central role in any final resolution.
G. Enterprise Law: Supplement to Entity Law or Universal Rule?
A fundamental remaining issue is whether enterprise law-
whether resting on "control" or "enterprise" or "economic entity"
-should replace entity law for all purposes, or whether entity law
324. Products liability lawyers advise segregation of group activities in sub-
sidiary companies exposed to such liability as a technique to reduce the possibility
of group liability. See Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Asset Acquisitions,
34 Bus. LAW. 489, 498 (1979); Kaden, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of Seller's
Product Liabilities in Asset Acquisitions, I1 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1978); Schwartz,
Product Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk
Relation, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689, 717 (1985).
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with at least its "core" attributes of the corporate personality should
continue to co-exist in a limited area with some form of enterprise
law.
1. Enterprise Law as a Universal Rule
At the present time, consideration of enterprise law as a universal
rule of law to replace entity law in the case of corporate groups is
not realistic. Entity law underlies our legal system. If enterprise law
were ever to be universal, such a monumental change would man-
ifestly be feasible only in the distant future.
Abandonment of entity law and substitution of enterprise law
to determine even such "core" corporate attributes as capacity to
sue and be sued, to contract, to hold and to transfer property, and
to exist perpetually would present the most difficult problems and
defy contemporary solution in national legal systems. From a global
perspective, universal reliance on enterprise law is also impractical
in a world with national legal systems overwhelmingly resting on
entity law. Enterprise law as a universal rule would require a world
legal order to develop legal rules for worldwide groups. Piecemeal
national introduction of unconditional enterprise lawv would inevitably
lead to serious conflict between such countries and other countries
continuing to be wedded to entity law. Extraterritorial application
of enterprise law by the home countries of parent corporations of
groups determining the fundamental legal rights and obligations of
constituent companies all over the world, irrespective of the national
policies of host governments, would produce international confron-
tation.
Entity law, accordingly, may be expected to continue for the
indefinite future. The realistic question is the extent to which it may
be supplemented by enterprise law as the corporate law evolves. In
the development of enterprise law as a supplement to entity law,
two theoretical approaches are possible: (a) a more sweeping sup-
plemental approach utilizing enterprise law to impose general group
liability with respect to all duties and obligations of all constituent
companies of the group; and (b) a more limited selective approach
utilizing enterprise law only in restricted areas of the law.
2. General Utilization of Enterprise Law for Imposition of
Group Liability for Group Obligations
An alternative to enterprise law as a universal rule supplanting
entity law in all respects is a supplemental approach in which equity
1990]
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law survives but is subject to enterprise law in particular areas. One
variation might be called the general supplemental approach. Under
this approach, entity law would continue unchanged insofar as sub-
stantive and most procedural rights are concerned. This area is not
controversial and the continuance of entity law for this purpose should
present no problems. However, in the area of corporate duties-the
area of overwhelming concern in corporate law today-enterprise
law would wholly replace entity law. The corporate group would be
held to stand behind every act of every one of its constituent com-
panies. Group assets would be available to pay group liabilities.
Limited liability for subsidiaries would come to an end. Economic
organization, not legal forms, would prevail. Utilization of a par-
ticular form of corporate structure, such as the organization of a
subsidiary rather than a branch, would no longer produce different
legal results.
This broad policy is essentially the approach utilized by the
Federal Republic of Germany in the Konzernrecht'23 and by the Eur-
opean Economic Community in its proposed Ninth Directive for
Harmonization of Company Law32 6 and its proposal for a European
Company law (Societas Europea).3 27
In the area of contract law, such a system need not mean the
end of subsidiary obligations not binding on the parent. Parties could
continue to bargain over credits. Non-recourse would merely become
a more complex concept. Entity law presumptively excludes personal
liability for the borrower and requires the creditor to look exclusively
to designated assets. In a system of enterprise law, by contrast, the
parties would have to contract expressly in order to achieve restriction
of recourse to the group component dealing with the lender while
providing for non-recourse against the parent corporation or other
affiliated companies of the group.
325. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, BGB1 1089 (1965); Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH),
German Stock Corporation Act (F. Juenger & L. Schmidt trans. 1967). See BLUM-
BERG: BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, 5 17.11, app. 747-81.
326. C.E.E. Doc, No. XV 593/75-E, arts. 7, 29 (draft document). An English
version appears in Bohlhoff & Budde, Company Groups- The EEC Proposal for a
Ninth Directive in the Light of the Legal Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 J.
COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 163, 181-92 (1984). See BLUMBERO: BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 39, at app. 789-94.
327. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies,
Bull. Eur. Comm. Supp. 4/75, art. 239 (May 13, 1975). See BLUMBERO: BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 39, at app. 783-88.
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In such a system of modified enterprise law, there would be no
need for general attribution of substantive rights of constituent com-
panies to each of the affiliated companies within the group. That
would serve no useful purpose. However, as in existing American
law in some areas of procedure, an attribution of certain procedural
rights and duties to parent and other affiliated companies of the
group would continue to implement more effectively the underlying
policies and objectives of the law in the particular area. This is
evident today in areas such as discovery, res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and injunctions.3 28 In such restricted procedural areas, en-
terprise law would supplement entity law in the very way it is
currently occurring, or beginning to occur, in the developing Amer-
ican law of corporate groups.
It should be recognized that reliance on enterprise law to replace
entity law for the imposition of duties, however serviceable for groups
operating in only one country, would not be without problems when
applied to far-flung multinational groups. The courts of each host
country around the world in which a group operated might seek toimpose the duties of a local subsidiary directly (or through extension
of bankruptcy proceedings) upon its parent corporation and affiliated
sister subsidiaries located anywhere in the world. This is exactly
what transpired through the application of enterprise law in the
celebrated Deltec case..3 29
This forbidding prospect, however, loses much of its frightening
mien when one takes into account the vast difference between ob-
taining a judgment in one nation and seeking to enforce it in another.
While a third world country may seek to impose liability for the
debts of a local affiliate upon affiliated group members around the
world, enforcement of such a judgment might still be feasible only
within the borders of the host country. Thus, as in the Deltec litigation
itself,330 other countries might refuse to recognize the judgment. Such
a refusal would be particularly likely in the case of countries still
328. See BLUMBERG: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at ch. 10, 11 & 15.
329. Compania Swift de La Plata, S.A. Frigorifica s/convocatoria de acreedores,
19 J.A. 579, 151 La Ley 516 (1973). See BLUMBERG: BANKmuprcY, supra note 39,
§ 17.16; Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw
AM. 320 (1974); Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudenee: Deltec Update, 11 LAwv A,.. 43
(1979).
330. Deltec Banking Corp. v. Compania Italo-Argentina de Electridad, S.A.,
171 N.Y.L.J. 18, at col. 1, Apr. 3, 1974 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 46 A.D.2d 847,
362 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Ist Dep't 1974), 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 741 (1974).
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wedded to entity law. Even where the home country or forum state
did recognize enterprise law in some form, such foreign judgments
would still have to satisfy the traditional requirements of international
law for enforcement of foreign judgments.131
Since the traditional debate over corporate personaltiy assumes
entity law, it has little to contribute to consideration of whether
entity law should be generally replaced by enterprise law with respect
to the obligations of constituent companies of corporate groups so
as to impose on parent and affiliated companies liability for all the
duties and obligations of every affiliate of the group. The modern
"strong entity" theory of the corporation that looks upon it as an
organic institution with an existence transcending its changing share-
holders readily describes the, modern large corporation with its thou-
sands, tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of public
shareholders. However, in a world of corporate groups, it does not
assist in a competing evaluation of entity and enterprise law.
Such an evaluation involves an analysis of the costs and benefits
of the existing recognition of multiple layers of limited liability to
the parent corporation and sub-holding companies insulating them
from the debts of dozens, if not hundreds, of junior companies of
the group 332 even where they are all engaged in the collective conduct
of a common enterprise in which any one subsidiary is merely a
controlled fragment. However, insofar as public investors in the
parent corporation of the group were concerned, an enterprise view
treating the group as the legal unit would make no change in their
insulation from liability. 33
Application of enterprise law imposing group liability on cor-
porate groups would not be without its costs.
The elimination of limited liability for subsidiary companies of
corporate groups should on the margin theoretically lead to the
deferral of some risky undertakings that might otherwise have been
undertaken by a parent corporation protected by limited liability.
Any such loss of new investment would be undesirable. However,
the extent to which the elimination of intra-group limited liability
331. See BLUMBERO: BANKRUTPCY, supra note 39, §§ 17.23, 17.24.
332. See BLUMBERO: PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at Table 5; Hadden, supra note
9, at 274.
333. Since the elimination of intragroup limited liability would prevent the
group from externalizing unsatisfied subsidiary obligations in the event of the
insolvency of a subsidiary, it would make groups as a whole less profitable and,
accordingly, indirectly affect shareholders.
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would deter some new investment by the parent corporation requires
further inquiry into the type of subsidiary obligation in question:
institutional debt, trade debt, employee obligations, tax and statutory
obligations, and tort (and other involuntary) obligations. These pre-
sent very different problems.
So long as bargains over credit are permitted and the subsidiary
can borrow on its own credit without recourse to the group, the
change in legal standards should have no impact on the economic
position of the subsidiary or the parent insofar as institutional and
other negotiated debt is concerned.
Insofar as trade debt is concerned, major purchases, like bor-
rowed debt transactions, could contractually exclude liability for
parent corporations. Such a provision might well become standard
boilerplate in the purchase order forms of such corporations and
thereby introduce credit as one of the terms of the bargain to be
negotiated. Only minor trade purchases where such use of purchase
order forms and reliance on such express exclusionary provisions
would be impractical would present increased risk for the parent
corporation desiring to minimize its own liability. This is not a
significant area of concern.
The impropriety of the use of subsidiary corporations as tech-
niques for avoiding obligations to employees should be dear. If
argument were needed in support of such an observation, it would
be readily found in the public policy underlying the statutes making
non-payment of wages criminal,3 ' imposing liability for payment of
wages on shareholders, 335 assigning a high priority to wage claims
in the distribution of assets in bankruptcy, 335 and in providing for
enterprise pension termination and withdrawal liability for controlled
groups in the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).3 7
Accordingly, to whatever extent the development of enterprise law
would prevent avoidance of employee obligations, it would be socially
useful rather than disadvantageous.
The adoption of rules of legal liability to permit a corporate
group to escape liability for unpaid taxes of subsidiaries conducting
334. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3 1-71g (1989); N.Y. LAB. L~w § 198-a (McKinney
1986).
335. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 630 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.40(6) (West 1957).
336. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982).
337. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b)(1), 1362, 1381 (1982). See BLUMBERG: GENERAL
STATUToRY LAW, supra note 10, §§ 16.04, 16.05.
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part of the group enterprise is similarly not likely to elicit any
significant support as desirable social policy. Furthermore, in the
law of regulated industries, where the Congress has established a
comprehensive regulatory program not expressly restricted to the
directly regulated company, construction of the underlying statute
on an entity rather than an enterprise basis risks weakening the
effectiveness of the regulatory program, frustrating the purpose of
the regulation, and permitting ready evasion.
Torts present a more complex picture, but the result is the
same. Potential tort liability could be a major economic problem
because removal of the limited liability of parent corporations and
sub-holding companies with respect to tort liability for the activities
of subsidiaries could be a serious disincentive to new group invest-
ment. However, such limited liability of the parent is deemed at-
tractive only because it permits the group to externalize costs of the
enterprise to third party victims. Such externalization of costs is
almost universally regarded as highly undesirable.3 38 Thus, even
economists generally supporting the social usefulness of limited lia-
bility concede that in the case of corporate groups, the use of limited
liability is unsound insofar as tort claimants and other involuntary
creditors are concerned. 339
Thus, in the end, concern over the elimination of limited liability
as costly and undesirable because of its potential for reduced in-
vestment must rest mainly on the additional group costs represented
by the minor trade debts of an insolvent subsidiary. These are only
an insignificant factor in the total picture.
Whatever its theoretical appeal, however, a radical change from
entity law to a general imposition of group liability for all group
obligations would inevitably require legislative action. It would in-
volve a political decision involving an issue that in the United States
is not as yet on the political agenda. Accordingly, it is of limited
immediate practical interest.
338. See Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chems., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 375, 381 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981). See also Calabresi, supra note 236; Klemme, supra note 236; Priest,
supra note 236.
339. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986);
Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 789, 875
(1979); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cti, L.
REV. 89, 103, 107, 112 (1985).
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3. Selective Utilization of Enterprise Law
The general approach described above would require legislative
enactment. The alternative of expansion of entity law to include
some form of enterprise law through judicial evolution inevitably
means a more selective approach. The judicial decisions to date
constituting the growing American law of corporate groups have
already taken the first steps to such a selective approach. This is
another alternative.
Contemporary concerns with corporate groups, whether or not
multinational, are evident in specialized areas of particular tension.
These are the areas in which judicial development of enterprise law
has been occurring. Group liability as a result of enterprise law has
great contemporary relevance in a number of areas: in statutes,
expansive enterprise construction in order to achieve effective systems
of regulation; in torts, to prevent externalities and to match costs
with the enterprise creating them; and in bankruptcy, to achieve
equality and fairness in the distribution of a debtor's assets to cred-
itors. Similarly, in certain areas of procedure, attribution both of
rights and of legal consequences on a group basis has already achieved
some recognition.
As I have attempted to show in the volumes comprising
the series on The Law of Corporate Groups, a selective legal solution
to the problem of the attribution of the legal consequences of the
activities of one controlled company to the others in the group requires
a multi-dimensional analysis. Such an analysis requires consideration
of the policies and objectives of the law in the area under consideration
in light of the structure, functioning, and other aspects of the par-
ticular group in the case. Enterprise law has been utilized to sup-
plement entity law where attribution or imposition of such legal
consequences would more effectively implement such policies and
objectives. Imposition of liability in matters involving substantive
common law differs fundamentally from procedural problems. En-
tirely different policies and objectives are involved. Further, contract
matters differ from tort, matters involving genuine bargains over
credit differ from matters lacking such bargains, and even more so
from matters not involving bargains at all, particularly involuntary
matters such as torts. Similarly, liability in tort or contract differs
from the recognition of rights in property. Finally, cases involving
the application of statutes raise issues very different from those
involved in common law controversies; such cases require courts to
implement statutory objectives and to prevent the frustration or
1990]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
evasion of regulatory programs, rather than to allocate costs between
private patties.
Even a selective new law of corporate groups would have a very
different content from traditional "piercing the veil jurisprudence,"
although it would serve much the same strategic purpose in the
corporate legal system. It would provide a framework in which the
legal system committed to the entity principle of corporate law as a
general rule could adapt on a case-by-case basis appropriate principles
to achieve socially acceptable results in those areas of law where
entity law as applied to corporate groups no longer serves the needs
of society.
VI. CONCLUSION
The elaborate debate over the nature of the corporate personality
over the past century is of limited usefulness in the formulation of
a new doctrine of "control" or "economic entity" or "enterprise"
to supplement the traditional concepts of entity law. In three major
respects, this debate is a prisoner of the experience of the past because
it assumes the continuation of entity law in its present form, without
its further evolution or replacement. It ignores the realities of the
times in failing to consider the crucial significance of corporate groups
in the global economy. Finally, it is concerned primarily with the
rights of the corporation, at a time when the most pressing societal
concerns involve the imposid-ion of duties on corporations.
The judicial decisions involving the nature of the corporate
personality also have only limited utility. As noted, the decisions are
hopelessly inconsistent insofar as some grand view of the "true"
nature of the corporation is concerned.
However, the traditional debate can usefully be seen as an
essential first step in the judicial formulation of a new supplementary
enterprise law. Further, the judicial decisions beginning to grapple
with the problems presented by corporate groups have unmistakably
demonstrated that control, economic integration, administrative and
financial interdependence, and use of a common group persona are
the fundamental building blocks for the development of supplemen-
tary enterprise law. In the common law tradition, such judicial
experience supports the feasibility of a gradual case-specific solution
to the serious problems pertaining to corporate groups.
Each of the classical theories in the traditional debate of the
corporate personality captures some of the attributes of the corporation.
None captures them all. In this, there is a parallel in science-the
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protracted debate over the nature of light. After decades of contro-
versy over whether light consisted of waves or of particles-a debate
not entirely dissimilar to that over the nature of the corporate per-
sonality-light was finally accepted as having features of both, par-
ticles in the form of waves.3 4 0 Similarly the corporation is
simultaneously the creature of the state, a complex of contracts among
the associated parties, and an institution with a real life of its own,
distinct from its members. Thus, although useful in highlighting
some aspect of the corporation-whether the essential predicate of
state action; or, the interests of shareholders reflected in corporate
operations; or, the independent institutional quality of the modem
corporation-each theory is inadequate in itself to provide a com-
prehensive understanding of the corporation as contemplated in entity
law. In addition, and most seriously, the theories do not even attempt
to deal with the consequences of the newer world of corporate groups.
It is neither surprising nor disturbing that the law has been
unable to emerge with a generally accepted unified corporate theory
embracing all of the elements discussed-state action, contract and
"real" entity-in the traditional discussion of entity law or of "con-
trol" or "unitary business" or "integrated enterprise" or some other
comprehensive standard of enterprise law. General concepts about
the nature of the corporate personality should not be expected to
determine the outcome of individual cases. 3 In the place of un-
yielding reliance on universal concepts as the decisive factor in judicial
analysis, the law should respond flexibly in responding to the infinite
varieties of corporate existence presented by modern economic so-
ciety. It should be primarily concerned with the interests and values
represented ,by the parties in the particular controversy and should
evaluate whether one approach or the other will more effectively
implement the underlying objectives of the law in the particular area
in question. In this process, transcendental concepts can usefully
provide frames of references for the examination of legal problems,
but should not rigidly control the outcome. Simplicity, of course,
has its advantages, but it also has severe limitations.
340. See N. HERBERT, QUANTUM REALITY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYsics 66-67
(1985); A. MARCH & I. FREEM AN, THE NEW WORLD OF PHYsiCs 125-31 (1962).
341. As noted, the indiscriminate universal application of the closely allied
concepts involved in "piercing the veil jurisprudence" irrespective of the nature of
the controversy has properly been much criticized and is being increasingly rejected.
See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE CoMoN LAWv, supra note 38, S 6.01.
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The debate of the past over the nature of the corporate per-
sonality has focussed on the implications of the theories to the at-
tribution of certain rights, particularly constitutional rights, to the
corporation in particular cases. In that process, the existence of the
corporate entity, with its traditional "core" attributes, has been
unchallenged and the significance of corporate groups, which did not
exist during most of this incubation period in the development of
the American law, ignored.
Since then, the economic society has dramatically changed. Cor-
porate structure has evolved from the simple model of the corporation
conducting a small business for shareholder-investors to the complex
world of corporate groups with parent corporations and sub-holding
companies and their subsidiaries (in which the senior companies in
the complex are shareholders) all collectively conducting fragments
of a world enterprise, divided and subdivided among the constituent
companies of the group to serve the convenience of the group.
As a result, the legal system developed long ago to deal with
the problems and to realize the objectives of those very different
times has become doubly anachronistic. It no longer responds ef-
fectively to the very different form of corporate organization within
each country's own borders. In addition, national legal systems based
on entity law have been confronted with newer problems arising
from the development of the corporation from its local origins to a
multinational force. Nation states are now forced to deal with mul-
tinational corporations.
Newer judicial concepts of corporate personality reflecting group
operations need not uproot the historic structure of entity law that
has been the foundation of corporation law for centuries past, at
least at the present stage in the development of the law. It seems
more productive, instead, to apply an enterprise view of corporate
personality insofar as corporate groups are concerned on a case-by-
case basis. Selective use of enterprise law furnishes the legal frame-
work for the imposition of duties and obligations of individual con-
stituents of the group on its affiliated constituent companies as
appropriate for the more effective implementation of the underlying
policies and objectives of the law in the particular area involved in
the case at hand.
As the relevant case law emerges, over the decades to come,
succeeding generations of legal scholars will have to decide whether
the development of enterprise law has ripened to the point where it
will then at last be productive to consider a radical contemporary
theory of the corporate personality to replace entity law. Then,
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perhaps there will come a time when enterprise law will serve as
the fundamental principle of corporation law governing corporate
groups. Such a development would dearly require a world legal order
in order to permit its application to each of the subsidiaries of
worldwide multinational groups.3 12
342. A substantially condensed version of this article is being presented as a
paper on The Corporate Personality in American Law: A Summary Review at the XIII
International Congress of Comparative Law; it will appear in the supplement to
38 Am. J. Comp. L. (1990).
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